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LABOR'S ACHILLES HEEL-THE UNRECOGNIZED
WORKER
I. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly assumed that in terms of legal protection
and organizational representation, the U.S. worker is one of the
most privileged in the world. Comparatively, this is true,' but it
is equally true that only one half of the U.S. workforce is cov-
ered by even the minimal protection afforded by federal mini-
mum wage and maximum hour legislation.2 Of this, even fewer
workers possess governmental recognition of the right to bargain
collectively;3 and of those "recognized" by law as eligible for
union representation, even less are actually represented.4
The percentage of U.S. workers in unions today stands at
17.9%, lower than at any point since collective bargaining laws
were passed.' It is one of the lowest percentages among the
1. In 1980, the world's labor force consisted of about 1.8 billion workers, out of which
only 535 million are in "developed" countries. In the "developing" countries, 25-30% of
the labor force is "self-employed." Ten to twenty-five percent work not for wages but as
part of a "familial" obligation. "A vast number of workers, including roughly 150 million
day laborers and 300 million self-employed and family workers in the agricultural and
informal sectors of the developing market economies, have little protection, either
through membership of a workers' organisation or by effective legislation." INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, WORLD LABOR REPORT 3-4 (1985) [hereinafter ILO REPORT].
Additionally, some of these countries maintain a system of forced labor that strips other
legal protection from workers as well. For example, a study conducted in eight states in
India found 2,244,000 workers in "debt bondage" in those states. Id. at 70.
2. In Current Labor Statistics, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1986, at 74, the workforce in
the United States is estimated to be more than 100 million. Out of this, only 56 million
workers are covered by federal "protective" legislation such as FLSA and OSHA. L. WEI-
NER, FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW 2-3 (1977) [hereinafter L. WEINER].
3. L. WEINER, supra note 2, at 2. Only 18 million are covered by federal collective
bargaining legislation out of this 56 million.
4. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNIONS TODAY: NEW TACTICS TO TACKLE TOUGH
TIMES 7 (1985) [hereinafter BNA REPORT]. BNA lists the current figure at less than 18
million.
5. After a dramatic rise in unionization immediately following passage of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, ch. 372 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-168 (1982)), union membership remained at between 20 and 33%. R. STEINBERG,
WAGES & HOURS 191 (1982). It began to decline in the mid-fifties and is now estimated
to be at less than 17.9%. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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world's "industrialized" nations.6 Concomitantly then, more
than four fifths of the workforce is "unrecognized," either in law
or fact. To understand what has widely been recognized as the
deteriorating position of organized labor in the United States, it
is necessary to understand the composition of this "unrecog-
nized" workforcej and its legal status, de facto and de jure.
Traditionally, the categories that have been excluded either
by law or in practice from the "privileges" granted the stere-
otypical U.S. worker include agricultural and household workers.
Their exclusion from most protective legislation can be ex-
plained by the nature of their employment relationship. The rise
in unionization in the U.S. closely paralleled the transformation
of the economy from primarily agricultural to primarily indus-
trial.' The proliferation of factories brought with it a centraliza-
tion of the workplace, often creating both the increased need for
and the possibility of successful efforts to organize.9 This was
not true of workers employed in the fields ° or in private homes.
To these "traditionally" unrecognized workers can be added
those categories that were subsequently created through the law
of supply and demand to meet specific needs of industry. In-
cluded here are workers employed through such devices as sub-
contracting or temporary agencies. The indirect employer-em-
ployee relationship thus created has allowed employers to
circumvent various benefits that would otherwise be available to
workers." An additional method of avoiding recognition and
other protections secured both by organizational struggles and
6. ILO REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. The ILO provides a table of trade union member-
ship in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries
which ranks the United States in the lowest percentile in terms of union membership in
industrialized countries. In fact, eighteen developing countries have higher percentages
of union membership than the United States. Id. at 11 (table 1.2).
7. The term "unrecognized worker" will be used throughout this article to denote
workers who are excluded from most federal legislation governing collective bargaining
rights and wage and hour regulations.
8. "By 1889, industrial production had supplanted agriculture as the factories for the
first time claimed more workers than the fields." R. STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 3.
9. Id.
10. Particularly migrant farm workers, where the transitory nature of both the employ-
ment and the residence continues to disrupt the ability to establish strong organizational
ties.
11. ILO REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. ILO lists the increasing use of part-time mi-
grant, transient and temporary employees as a factor in explaining a low union member-
ship in the U.S. for the past twelve years. See also infra text accompanying note 227.
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legislative efforts has been physical relocation to geographic ar-
eas where unionization is less prevalent or where local laws are
less favorable to labor.12 This phenomenon, known colloquially
as the "run-away shop,"'" has historically encompassed reloca-
tion both within the U.S. and overseas, particularly to third
world countries. Recent events, however, have increasingly
closed this avenue to employers. Domestically, long and costly
legal battles have established union footholds even in tradition-
ally anti-union strongholds." Internationally, ejection of United
States corporations after revolutions and civil wars in various
African, Asian and Latin American nations has graphically
demonstrated that many of these sources of "cheap labor" may
be unwilling to continue in that role, forcing U.S. industry in-
creasingly to seek out new "exploitable" pools of workers at
home. 15
It is in this historical context that a new category of "unrec-
ognized worker" has been legislatively created from the abun-
dant pool of unemployed" and otherwise unorganized workers.
Whether they are labelled "trainees" in government-sponsored
training programs, "recipients" in what is euphemistically called
12. ILO REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. See also R. STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 5.
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (5th ed. 1979).
14. An example of this is the Farah strike against the Texas clothing manufacturer,
popularized in the movie Norma Rae, and the song Come on Virgie. The strike, lasting
almost ten years and involving extensive NLRB proceedings, finally resulated in a con-
tract and recognition of the union. See generally San Francisco Bay Area Farah Strike
Support Committee, Chicanos Strike at Farah (Jan. 1974) (published by United Front
Press).
15. The presence of U.S. corporations in these third world nations is common knowl-
edge. Workers in these countries have traditionally been relied on by U.S. industry as a
cheap source of labor and as a means of staying competitive in the global economy. Since
the Viet Nam war (and the loss of rubber and oil resources along with the workers who
processed them there), the expulsion of U.S. corporations from Nicaragua, and various
other international upheavals, the cost of operating factories in these countries, even
when legally permitted by the governments there, has become prohibitive. This is cer-
tainly a possible explanation for the recent interest by these corporations in such domes-
tic innovations as the "urban enterprise zone," or the availability of "workfare" recipi-
ents to the pri'ate sector. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
16. The Bureau of Labor Statistics lists the unemployment rate at over 7% in 1985.
Current Labor Statistics, supra note 2, at 74. This figure, however, does not include
those who are not eligible for unemployment benefits, such as those who have never been
employed, whose unemployment benefits have run out, or who have been working in jobs
that are off the books or otherwise do not provide unemployment coverage. (Domestic
workers fall into this category, for example).
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. V
"workfare,' 7 or simply unfortunate enough to be located in an
"Urban Enterprise Zone,"' 8 this latest category of "unrecognized
worker" threatens to become a source of exploitable labor the
likes of which has not been seen in this country since the 19th
century, when slavery was ostensibly abolished. These workers,
existing as they do outside of the normal channels of commerce
and the traditional employer-employee relationship, have no
well-defined legal status. This fact not only affords them little
protection against their own exploitation, but makes it equally
difficult to prevent their use as quasi-governmental "scabs" in
undermining the legal and economic gains made by the "recog-
nized" worker. 9
What all of these categories of unrecognized workers have in
common is that they have been defined in the negative by their
exclusion from a governmentally recognized "right" to organ-
ize.20 This is somewhat misleading since it can be argued that
the right to organize is derived not from the statutory provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2' and subsequent
17. This term, which will be used throughout the article, generally will be applied to
any arrangement whereby a recipient of a governmental grant of money or services is
required to work in exchange for such grant.
18. An urban enterprise zone is a geographic area designated under recent state en-
actments for special treatment in terms of tax incentives and deregulation of employers
who relocate to what is considered under the enactment to be an "economically de-
pressed" area. While names and definitions vary from state to state at this time, legisla-
tion is pending before Congress for the creation of federal "urban enterprise zones." H.R.
1932, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) and S. Res. 2914, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), are the
most recent proposals. It has been proposed that, among the regulations to be suspended
in these zones, the minimum wage and various collective bargaining protections should
either be eliminated or made more "flexible." Some Reagan administration officials have
in the past described the minimum wage as one of the worst enemies of the unemployed,
since it discourages employers from hiring those whose skill levels do not make them
"deserving" of it. Former Secretary of Labor Ray Donovan has been quoted as saying
that a "subminimum wage will cut minority unemployment faster and further than most
other Government job programs and at no cost to the Government." N.Y. Times, May 6,
1984, at 25, col. 2.
19. As used here, the term "scab" refers to workers who undermine either directly as
strikebreakers or indirectly through depressing the wages and benefits that organized
workers might otherwise obtain.
20. In this context, a "right" to organize is defined as an affirmative statutory recog-
nition of that right, including provision of'a governmental administrative body to oversee
and, where it is deemed necessary, intervene in relations between employers and
employees.
21. The National Labor Relations Act, originally passed in 1935 as the National La-
bor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
amendments, but from the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits
the Government from interfering with freedom of association,
speech and assembly.2
There are two problems with this argument, however. First,
while the Constitution guarantees the right to associate and even
to organize,2" it does not assure "recognition" of that association,
either by the employer or by the Government.2 4 Actual recogni-
tion has generally required exertion of organizational force.25 It
is one thing to be able to meet in a room and discuss grievances.
It is another to be able to force an employer to redress those
grievances. "Recognition" of an association of workers can be
bestowed by statute or it can be fought for directly, but before
the benefits of association can be obtained, recognition must ex-
ist in some form or another. Secondly, despite any constitutional
prohibitions against governmental "interference" with the right
to associate, actual interference, either "under color of law" or
by private parties acting with government protection, has ex-
isted throughout U.S history.2" When the government finally
took affirmative legislative action to protect labor's right to or-
ganize, that "protection" itself proved to be a double-edged
sword in the sense that it created a legal wall between the
"haves" and the "have nots" of the working class. An analysis of
the legal status of and recourse available to various categories of
workers under U.S. statutory and case law reveals that labor is
possibly in a weaker position today than it was before it was
divided and categorized legislatively. This weakness is directly
151-168 (1982)), has since been amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1982)), and by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act
of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1957).
23. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
24. See Local 370, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Detrick, 592 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir.
1979); see also Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463,
464 (1979), where the Supreme Court stated that while the first amendment protects the
right to associate, it "is not a substitute for the national labor relations laws."
25. Ratner, To them that Hath Shall be Given, 9 INT'L J. Soc. OF LAW 303 (1981).
26. See generally R. BOYER & H. MORAls, LABOR's UNTOLD STORY (1972). This book
offers extensive examples of the obstacles, both legal and otherwise, facing workers in
their attempts throughout U.S. history to organize. Additionally, in F. FRANKFURTER &
N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930), the authors trace the history of the use of the
injunction against labor prior to federal laws specifically governing collective bargaining.
1988] NOTES 503
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
traceable to the presence of the unrecognized worker. A chain is
only as strong as its weakest link.
II. EARLY LEGISLATION
To understand the current position of the unrecognized
worker, some legislative background is necessary. The history of
labor law can best be described by division into two periods: pre-
and post-NLRA. It was not until the acute upheaval of the
Great Depression that it was considered constitutionally permis-
sible to interfere with the freedom to contract27 that was alleged
to exist between the individual employer and employee. Early
attempts by states to legislate wages and hour controls were held
unconstitutional as intrusions on individual liberty. 8 The only
protection available to the 19th century U.S. worker was self-
protection through unions, organized independently of any gov-
ernmentally bestowed status and along broad industrial lines. 29
The issues addressed by these early forms of labor organization
often went beyond narrow trade concerns. Fights concerning the
demand for the eight-hour day, for example, typically enlisted
the support and participation of the whole community.30 The
tactics employed to win these early demands included mass
demonstrations and marches that were neither legally sanc-
tioned nor specifically proscribed. These were often met with
equally "extra-legal" tactics by employers, such as the use of
armed Pinkerton guards to break strikes." These private armies
27. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905), which describes a New
York maximum hour law as "an illegal interference with the rights of individuals to
make contracts regarding labor."
28. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 26, at 147-48. See also R. STEINBERG,
supra note 5, at 4.
29. The National Labor Union, organized in 1866, was the first nationwide federation
of labor. It addressed, in addition to its members' labor demands and the need for inclu-
sion of workers regardless of race or sex, such issues as currency reform and "Wall
Street's control" of the economy. R. BOYRER & H. MORAlS, supra note 26, at 35-36. Per-
haps the best known of these early unions, the Industrial Workers of the World (or
"Wobblies" as they were known colloquially), generally organized along class rather than
trade lines, and added such issues as U.S. participation in what they considered to be a
war instigated by the predatory capitalists of the United States to their agenda. Id. at
197-98. Boyer and Morais also describe the massive nationwide mobilization of the
Knights of Labor for legislative recognition of a universal eight-hour day. Id. at 87-91.
30. Women and children, as well as those in sympathy with the workers' demands,
were instrumental in these fights.
31. R. BOYER & H. MORALS, supra note 26, at 68. See also F. FRANKFURTER & N.
[Vol. V
1988] NOTES
were sometimes joined by government troops sent in to "keep
order,"3 and local criminal statutes3 were often applied against
the activities of the workers.
Despite judicial reluctance to permit legislative intervention
between workers and their employers, the nascent unions were
able to secure passage of several isolated labor laws before the
turn of the century, generally after long and bloody battles.3 4
One of the state aims of these early efforts was to bring the con-
ditions of unorganized workers to a level of parity with those
who were organized.3" It was believed by these organizations
that in the long run, this would protect both groups by prevent-
ing the development of a disadvantaged workforce that could be
used to undermine gains made by organized workers. Consistent
with this intent, one of the first federal labor laws, passed in
1885 through the efforts of the Knights of Labor, prohibited the
importation of "contract labor."36 Under the widely used con-
GREENE, supra note 26, at 71-72, 120-21 (discussing the use by employers of paid spies
and private armies).
32. An example of this is the infamous "Haymarket Massacre," an event that became
the basis of the international celebration of "Mayday," except in the United States,
where it is conspicuously not celebrated as a workers' holiday and has been renamed
"Law Day." The "massacre" occurred when a bomb was thrown into a square where
some 80,000 demonstrators and 1350 National Guardsmen were gathered on May 1,
1886, as part of the efforts of the Knights of Labor to establish the eight-hour day. Sev-
eral leaders of the "Knights" were sentenced to death despite international protest; it
was widely believed, though never proven, that the bomb was thrown by a provocateur
paid by employers opposed to the Knights' demands. See R. BOYER & H. MORALS, supra
note 26, at 91-101.
33. Most commonly used were local ordinances such as those against trespass or va-
grancy, which could be applied selectively against strikers or union organizers. In some
cases, however, criminal statutes were written specifically aimed at or for use against
labor. For example, in 1919, California enacted the Criminal Syndicalism Act, which de-
fined "criminal syndicalism" as "any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding
and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage, unlawful acts of force or violence as a
means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any
political change." G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1007 (11th ed. 1985).
34. See generally R. BOYER & H. MORAIS, supra note 26.
35. Ratner, supra note 25, at 306, 313. In E. BRANDEIS, HISTORY OF LABOR LEGISLA-
TION IN THE U.S. (1935), the author describes the intent of promoters of the ten-hour law
in Massachussets as follows: "The legislation was really desired to bring the textile mills
up to the ten-hour standard which had been secured in other trades largely through
trade union action. The preponderance of women aid children in [that] field had made
organization particularly difficult."
36. R. BOYER & H. MORAIS, supra note 26, at 67 n.1. It is questionable, however,
whether use of "contract labor" has in fact been eliminated by this law. Note the prac-
tice described in Lopez v. Rodriguez, 668 F.2d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1981), where an employer
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tract labor system, workers, recruited largely from overseas, be-
came indebted to the employer for the cost of passage and food.
They were then forced to work off the debt at whatever "wage"
the employer set. When this practice was finally outlawed, the
prescribed remedy was deportation of the contract worker.'7
By the end of the 19th century, it became apparent that a
complete "hands off" policy towards industrial relations was
contributing to the development of monopolies that were them-
selves beginning to destroy the purported "laissez-faire" nature
of the American economy. 8 When these monopolies began to ex-
ert their control not only over labor, but over the consumer mar-
ket and their competition as well, federal authority to intervene
was found. In 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed. 9
When the Act was first introduced, it was generally believed that
"labor combination" did not come within its scope. However, be-
tween 1892 and 1896, the Government brought ten cases under
the Act before the courts. Out of these ten, five were against
labor and five were against corporations. Four of the five against
labor were decided in favor of the government. Only one of the
five against corporations was successful.'0
By the turn of the century, union membership had in-
creased from 447,000 in 1897 to 2,072,700 in 1904; a 364% in-
crease."1 Employers, organized through such vehicles as the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers,"2 began a counteroffensive
designed to portray organized labor as a threat to the American
system.' The first test of whether the Supreme Court would up-
sponsored an immigrant domestic worker who was obliged to work for several years with
the cost of room and board deducted from her wages in exchange for the sponsorship.
See also infra note 191.
37. R. BOYER & H. MORAlS, supra note 26, at 67 n.1.
38. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
39. Sherman Antitrust Act ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982)).
40. R. BOYER & H. MORALS, supra note 26, at 107 n.3. See also F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREENE, supra note 26, at 231-48 (apps. I & II).
41. R. BOYER & H. MORAIS, supra note 26, at 139.
42. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) was an organization of em-
ployers that played a prominent role in both opposing passage of legislation protecting
labor and passing and enforcing (legally or otherwise) legislation against labor.
43. R. BOYER & H. MORAlS, supra note 26, at 140. NAM's official publication declared
on December 1, 1904, that "[slince there is no economic difference between the shorter
work day and the proposition to divide up all property and start all over again, the
sentimentalists and meddlers all array themselves, whether they mean it or not, on the
[Vol. V
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hold application of the Sherman Antitrust Act against labor
came in 1908. The case, Loewe v. Lawlor," involved a national
boycott organized against a hat manufacturer in an effort to
force it to recognize the union. The court declared the Union
Hatters of North America and the American Federation of La-
bor to be an illegal combination, and fined them what was then
the staggering sum of $234,000 for their activity-"'
Six years later, the Clayton Antitrust Act of 191446 was
passed as a revision of the Sherman Act. It was supposed to
have protected labor from the injunctive reach of its predeces-
sor.47 Article 20 seemed to prohibit the enjoining of picketing,
primary and secondary boycotts, assembly and other common
forms of labor association.48 In the first application of the new
law by the Supreme Court, however, the Court read the Act to
protect only legitimate aims of labor organizations and found
that the secondary boycott fell outside of this protection.49 It
was not until 1932, with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,5" that a specific anti-injunction policy was declared towards
labor.
To defend the right to organize pre-NLRA, in the face of
court decisions restrictive of that right, labor attempted to in-
voke the protection of the free speech and assembly guarantees
of the first and fourteenth amendments. At least one labor or-
side of the collectivists." Id.
44. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
45. Id. See R. BOYER & H. MORALS, supra note 26, at 140; See also F. FRANKFURTER &
N. GREENE, supra note 26, at 215 (discussing the concept of illegal "combination of
laborers").
46. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1982)).
47. Section 6 of the Clayton Act included a declaration that "the labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce." See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE,
supra note 26, at 142-43.
48. R. BOYRER & H. MORALS, supra note 26, at 181 n.7.
49. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921). Compare this
decision with New York State's position on use of the secondary boycott as described in
F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 26, at 44.
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1932). Frankfurter's and Greene's book, written shortly
before the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, was written partially as
justification for that legislation. It should also be noted that under current law, "Norris-
LaGuardia" protects unions and other labor associations from injunction only when the
injunctions are sought outside of the auspices of the NLRA, "Taft-Hartley," and "Lan-
drum-Griffin."
1988]
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ganization, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), 51 con-
sciously avoided narrow trade union demands and instead built
a "one-big-union" platform. IWW organizers concentrated
largely on unskilled and immigrant labor. Their free speech
stand was based partially on a conscious choice to broaden their
base to include the unemployed and others generally excluded
from traditional unions, and partially on necessity. The practical
and legal obstacles they encountered in their attempts to organ-
ize at the worksite 2 forced them to make their appeals on street
corners as they moved from town to town to avoid arrest.5 IWW
organizers were jailed on charges ranging from loitering and dis-
turbing the peace to "criminal syndicalism" or "incitement to
riot." These charges were based on statutes that were in some
cases passed specifically with the IWW them in mind."' Though
their efforts did in fact broaden the base of union membership,
the IWW itself ended up spending much of its energy and re-
sources on lengthy defense trials attempting to get its leadership
out of prison.5
The backbone of IWW and many of the unions in the early
years of the 20th century was the large mass of immigrant labor-
ers that had come to the United States for economic betterment.
During World War I, the IWW took the position that its mem-
bers should not participate in a war called by the "master
class,"56 that in effect pitted workers from one country against
51. See P. BRISSENDEN, THE I.W.W. - A STUDY IN AMERICAN SYNDICALISM (1920).
52. Generally, these included trespass charges as well as the firing of workers who
were caught talking to organizers. Where workers were migratory, the problems were
compounded.
53. R. BOYER & H. MORAIS, supra note 26, at 173, 198.
54. For example, Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927), upholding a conviction under the California Criminal Syndicalism
statute, noted that the Act did not appear to violate the fourteenth amendment since the
California legislature, in passing the Act, based it on the "existence of a conspiracy, on
the part of members of the International Workers of the World [sic], to commit present
serious crimes."
55. By the end of February, 1918, 2000 Wobblies were in jail awaiting trial. R. BOYER
& H. MORAIS, supra note 26, at 198. Most of these were convicted. In Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U.S. 380 (1927), an IWW organizer had been convicted in state court for soliciting
new members for the organization. Even though the conviction was eventually over-
turned by the Supreme Court, several years and much-needed union funds had already
been dedicated to the effort.
56. In a speech in support of Bill Haywood and other Wobbly leaders who were then
in jail for their anti-war activities, Eugene Debs stated: "The master class has always
[Vol. V
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workers from another. This was particularly appealing to work-
ers that had, in many cases, just come from Europe themselves.
This campaign added the dimension of political struggle to that
of economic that the IWW had been leading, and gave employ-
ers another avenue through which to attack labor: anti-sedition
laws.5 For an anti-war speech made at an IWW rally in Chicago,
Eugene Debs, veteran leader of the Pullman strike of 1894,58 was
convicted in 1918 of ten different violations of the 1917 Espio-
nage Act.59 He was sentenced to ten years in prison. 0 The Attor-
ney General who spearheaded the prosecution was Mitchell
Palmer, a businessman on the boards of several banks and util-
ity companies. He closely coordinated the running of the Justice
Department with colleagues of his in the National Association of
Manufacturers who would report "suspected" seditious activity
to him. The Justice Department would then issue warrants for
deportation."
This coordination culminated in the "Palmer Raids" of Jan-
uary 2, 1920.62 In one night, over 10,000 U.S. workers, both
aliens and citizens, most of them trade union members and some
of them trade union officials, were hauled from their beds, drag-
declared the war; the subject class has always fought the battles." R. BOYER & H.
MORAlS, supra note 26, at 200.
57. Laws against "sedition" and "seditious libel" in general (i.e., the prohibition
against criticism of the Government, its laws or institutions) had been declared unconsti-
tutional in the U.S. since the 18th century. G. GUNTHER, supra note 33, at 975. However,
Congress used its powers under the emergency and war powers principle to pass the
Espionage Act of 1917 which made it illegal to willfully cause or attempt to cause insub-
ordination or to interfere with enlistment in the military. Under this law, no actual inter-
ference or advocacy of any unlawful acts was required. Id. at 986 n.3.
58. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 26, at 17-19.
59. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
60. In 1920, while Debs was serving this sentence, he ran in the presidential election
and received over 900,000 votes (3.4% of the total). G. GUNTHER, supra note 33, at 989
n.1.
61. According to one federal official at the time, the process worked as follows:
[Tihese corporations are loaded up with what they call 'undercover' men
who must earn their salaries. They go around and get into organizations and
report the cases to the detectives for the larger companies. These detectives in
turn report to the chiefs of police. . .generally. . .placed there by the corpora-
tions. The corporation orders an organization raided by the police department,
the members are taken in, thrown into the police station, and the Department of
Justice is notified.
R. BOYER & H. MORAIS, supra note 26, at 214.
62. Id. at 212-14.
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ged out of meetings, grabbed on the streets and thrown into jail
to await deportation proceedings. Of these, 6500 were later re-
leased without any charges at all. In 1924, J. Edgar Hoover, who
had been Palmer's assistant during the raid and who was then
acting director of the FBI, virtually admitted that what was
done during the massive raid was not according to existing law."3
The chilling effect that this had on labor organization, however,
can be seen from the fact that between 1920 and 1923, member-
ship in the American Federation of Labor dropped from over
four million to under three million. 4
III. FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN LABOR RELATIONS
It took the extreme social, economic and political unrest of
the thirties before labor legislation on a federal level was seri-
ously considered. There are two possible explanations for this
policy reversal. First, it can be said that conditions so drastically
worsened that employers and legislators were forced to recon-
sider the existing policy on humanitarian grounds." Alterna-
tively, it was clear to some that in order to preserve stability, it
had become essential to have some kind of "handle" on labor; to
prescribe what would be considered "acceptable" and what
would be "out of bounds."6 6 Without any official grant of status,
an existential labor movement had already proven itself capable
of "interfering with the flow of commerce" in order to secure its
demands. 7 Government "recognition" of the labor movement
could only help to bring it within the scope of legislative con-
63. Id. at 214 n.13.
64. Id. at 209.
65. This was certainly true of some of the proponents of federal labor legislation. See,
e.g., R. STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 5.
66. Id. at 13-14, Steinberg explains: "Sometimes, in order to maintain the fundamen-
tal features of the system, political elites will make concessions to the working class.
Indeed, sociologist Fred Block and others contend, and I agree, that pressures for politi-
cal reforms initiated by subordinate interest groups have been one of the most important
stimulants to the expansion of the state."
67. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1937), the Court, in
upholding the newly passed NLRA, stated:
[Tihe grant of authority to the Board does not purport to extend to the relation-
ship between all industrial employees and [employers]. It purports to reach only
what may be deemed to burden or obstruct [interstate or foreign] com-
merce. . . .[It] is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which
is the criterion.
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trol65 This latter purpose had been expressed as early as 1886,
several years before then-president Grover Cleveland invoked
the Sherman Antitrust Act against labor in the Pullman
Strike. 9 In a presidential speech, Cleveland outlined a proposal
for a federal apparatus to govern labor relations "before condi-
tions worsened."' 0 His proposal to set up an intervening govern-
mental agency that would stand between labor and capital was
not, however, to come about for fifty more bloody years.
It is probable that both benevolence and fear of the alterna-
tives played some role in passage of the first federal labor laws.
Only the latter, however, explains the exclusion of the large cat-
egories of workers most in need and least able to protect them-
selves. The original law submitted to Congress by Franklin
Roosevelt was the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. 1' It
covered workers in key industries by establishing industry
boards composed of private representatives of business and la-
bor. These boards would draft codes of "self-regulation" that
would then take on the force of law.7 12 It is axiomatic that labor's
interests could only be effectively protected through these codes
if the particular industry in question was already organized. 3
The NIRA was, however, declared unconstitutional both because
it improperly delegated legislative power to private parties and
because it was believed that Congress lacked the power to im-
68. Ratner, supra note 25, at 304.
In terms of the actual historical experience of their short-run self interest, such
innovations are seen by employers as restrictions on contractual liberty and by
workers as protecting labor's welfare. [But] viewed more recently in terms of the
long-run interests of these two classes, these reforms are cast as innovations that
help to rationalize and sustain a social order objectively in the interests of the
employers.
Id.
69. See supra text accompanying note 58.
70. DiBacco, A Century of Federal Labor Law, Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 14,
1986, at 16. "[Tjhe risk of a loss of popular support and sympathy resulting from a
refusal to submit to so peaceful an instrumentality would constrain both parties to such
disputes to invoke its interference and abide by its decisions." Id.
71. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). See G. GUNTHER,
supra note 33, at 123.
72. Id.
73. An amorphous body of workers without political leadership or effective voice
could not be represented on these boards, even if boards were established in these unor-
ganized industries. As summarized by Ratner in his article: "Power begets reform; organ-
ization begets power." Ratner, supra note 25, at 306.
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pose such regulation. 4
The NIRA was followed in 1935 by the National Labor Re-
lations (Wagner) Act.75 This Act established an administrative
agency empowered to regulate transactions between labor and
management for the avowed purpose of insuring that these
transactions were peaceful, 76 and equalizing what was widely
recognized to be an unequal bargaining position between labor
and management.7 Employers were required to recognize and
bargain with representatives of "employees" that had been "cer-
tified" by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The Act
defined who would and would not be considered an "em-
ployee. '78 Discretion to decide whether a workforce was covered
by the Act, whether a particular group was an "appropriate bar-
gaining unit," or whether a particular representative would be
"certified," lay with the Board. 9 On the one hand, this made the
job of the union easier. It no longer had to both organize the
workers and fight the employer for recognition before it could
even get to the bargaining table over wages and working condi-
tions. As long as it was able to produce authorization cards from
a specified number of appropriate employees, it could simply pe-
74. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982).
76. As stated by the Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42
(1937):
Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right
of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choos-
ing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of
industrial peace. . . .This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor dis-
turbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of
instances.
77. Section 1 of the Findings and Policies of the NLRA describes the "inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or
actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other
forms of ownership associations." 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) reads:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter states otherwise but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed
by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of independent con-
tractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or by any other person who
is not an employer as herein defined.
Per § 152(2), "employer" excludes, inter alia, the U.S. government or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any State or political subdivision.
79. See generally 29 U.S.C. §159.
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tition for an election and be granted recognition. Theoretically
at least, it was only then that the fight with the employer would
begin, under the watchful eye of the NLRB.
There were, however, drawbacks to this process as well.
Recognition that could be so easily won could now be just as
easily taken away through decertification.80 The limitation on
who could be included in a particular bargaining unit resulted,
for example, in the exclusion of some part-time or temporary
workers or those in related but distinct units who would previ-
ously have been able to add their numerical strength to the
unit's bargaining position.81 Finally, a major "by-product" of
this federal legislation was the creation of a segregated category
of worker that was "unrecognized." While the Wagner Act was
considered by both its supporters and opponents to be "pro-la-
bor," it was, in reality, pro only a for small segment of labor.
Not suprisingly, the law "recognized" only the segment that had
already achieved a not insignificant degree of recognition on its
own.
Ostensibly, the explanation for the exclusion of certain cate-
gories of workers from the labor laws is that, constitutionally,
federal authority to regulate labor relations only extended to
those categories engaged in labor "affecting commerce." 2 This
might justify the Act's specific exclusion of those workers "in the
domestic service of any person in his home. 83 It may also ra-
tionally apply to those employed by state and local govern-
ments."' It is difficult to see, however, how Congress could use
80. Decertification elections to end union representation have increased more than
threefold since 1970, with unions ousted three times out of four. Of the 301 decertifica-
tion elections certified by the NLRB in 1970, unions won in only 91. In 1983, there were
922 decertification elections, with unions winning only 232. BNA REPORT, supra note 4,
at 8.
81. See, e.g., Justak Bros. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074, 1079-80 (7th Cir. 1981); Cardo v.
Lakeland School Dist., 592 F. Supp. 765 (1984).
82. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Compare Marshall v. Cordero, 508 F. Supp. 324 (D.C.P.R.
1981) (the court rationalized the 1974 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 88
Stat. 55 (1974), 29 U.S.C. §§ 202-208, 210, 212-214, 216, 255, 260, 621 note, 630, 633a,
634, which included domestic workers for the first time).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). The "political subdivision" exclusion has, in addition to com-
merce clause limitations, invoked tenth and eleventh amendment concerns. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Austin Dev. Center, 606 F.2d 785 (1979), where a private non-profit agency
under contract with a city claimed the "political subdivision" exception in arguing that
its employees should not be recognized.
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this constitutional limitation on its powers to justify the exclu-
sion of agricultural workers, whose effect on commerce had been
recognized in various other Congressional enactments as well as
in case law.85
A more practical explanation for the categorical exclusion of
these groups of workers from federal law lies in the fact that at
the time of the passage of the laws, these workers had not in fact
been organized. The nature of their employment made work-
place organizing more difficult, if not impossible. This in turn
made traditional union methods of membership recruitment in-
effective .8  Traditional methods of enforcement of union de-
mands were likewise unavailable based on, for example, the in-
feasibility of effectively picketing a field or private home.87 It
was not, in fact, until many years after NLRA that some of
these unrecognized workers were able to make any headway in
their organizing efforts. What success they did have came largely
through use of tactics such as secondary boycotts, which had al-
ready been outlawed for use by "recognized" workers with the
passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA 8 At the
time of their exclusion from the NLRA, these unrecognized
workers, unlike their industrial counterparts, had not been able
to exert effective organizational force on their own. Therefore
85. Compare the exclusion of farm workers from NLRA protection on commerce
clause grounds to the Supreme Court's rationale in upholding penalties imposed, pursu-
ant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1281-1393, on a farmer's excess wheat harvest. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125
(1942) (the Court reasoned that, although the controversy was based on a small farmer's
harvest of excess wheat for his own use, the activity could "be reached by Congress [be-
cause] it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce").
86. For domestics, the fact that the "employer" was generally employing a single in-
dividual, and the workplace was a private home, made it infeasible to attempt traditional
labor association since even if other workers could be found, each faced an individual
employer and unique conditions. See infra text accompanying notes 169-73. For farm
workers, the transitory nature of the work, the fact that the employer controlled not only
the worksite but the home as well in many cases, and the fact that the work was gener-
ally seasonal, all added to the difficulties in building a membership base.
87. In Annenberg v. Southern California District Council of Laborers, 113 Cal. Rptr.
519, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637 (1974), a California court upheld the right of domestic servants
engaged in a labor dispute to picket the home, but put special restrictions on when and
where the picketing could occur in light of the employer's right to privacy. The workers
eventually lost their recognition bid and were replaced.
88. When these unrecognized workers did prove effective in their attempts to organ-
ize and to engage in "concerted labor action," the tactics they could most effectively use
given their situation were outlawed. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 222-23.
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coverage under the law was was not necessary to quell unrest,
i.e., to stop "unfettered" exercise of organizational strength. It
was also not politically expedient to include these workers. They
were not an organized political voice, while in many cases their
employers were. Their exclusion then was in spite of the fact
that it was precisely these categories of workers who were most
in need of "protection."
This is consistent with the postulation by Marx and Engels,
in their analysis of the dynamics of labor's relation to capital,
that "all change in regard to the labor market is an outgrowth of
class-based conflict," '89 as opposed to humanitarian concern.90 In
effect, this means that the fact that an objective need exists is
89. See generally Ratner, supra note 25, at 306-307. Marx explains that every histori-
cal "epoch" has two primary classes; the one that controls the means of production and
the one that produces. In slavery (when the economy was based primarily upon individu-
ally owned farms), the classes were the masters and the slaves, and as long as the
"mode" of production was sufficient to produce enough to maintain both classes, they co-
existed in relative peace. When production on individual farms began to be insufficient
based both on an increase in population and the need for some larger form of social
protection from hostile outsiders, feudalism developed, bringing with it the development
of the centralized "feudal estate" as the mode of production (or "sub-structure"), and
introducing the serf as the primary producer. (Additional sub-classes also existed, such
as knights, clergy, etc., but these did not play a primary role in the economic system.
They were part of what Marx labels the "superstructure.") The feudal economy com-
bined an agricultural base with the beginnings of other types of production. Artisans and
other small producers formed the beginning of the "bourgeoisie," a class that was to
expand and develop into larger more centralized industries. As technology advanced, this
"bourgeoisie" began to produce in larger quantities and to centralize into factories and
cities, and the agricultural production began to be secondary to this. Feudalism, (and
small artisan production), was no longer sufficient to support the population that itself
was increasingly removed from its land base, and relied on the production of others to
survive. This was the beginning of "capitalism." Marx maintains that history progresses
not because of the existence of great men or ideas, but primarily because of economic
struggle to increase production and to provide more efficiently for man's basic needs, as
those needs increase. Id.
90. In the preface to CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1859), Marx further explains
his materialist conception of the development of laws and other changes in the political
and social relationships (superstructure) of a society:
The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and
intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that deter-
mines their existence, but rather it is their social existence that determines their
consciousness.
At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in
society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or-what is
but a legal expression of the same thing-with the property relations within
which they have been at work before. . .With the change of the economic foun-
dation, the entire immense superstructure is . . .transformed.
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insufficient to cause the passage of social legislation. Extension
of "legal" protection would seem to require a pre-existing organ-
ized constituency that could "translate demands for legal rights
into effective political action."91 The history of efforts by farm
and domestic workers to improve their conditions would seem to
bear this out.
It was not only unrecognized workers that were harmed by
the labor laws; the effect of these laws on the workers they "rec-
ognized" has not been completely beneficent. One of the main
strengths of organized labor pre-NLRA was the fact that it re-
lied heavily on "labor solidarity," the ability to broaden the
struggle of a particular group of workers through enlisting the
support of others in the community sympathetic to their plight.
The general strike of San Francisco in May of 1934, one year
before the passage of the NLRA, was a dramatic example of this
strength.2 This massive strike which lasted through July of
1934, virtually shut down the city and involved not only other
unions, but thousands of sympathizers who were not themselves
in unions. While this "solidarity" was not directly restricted by
provisions of the NLRA until nearly thirteen years later,' an
indirect effect of the 1935 Act was to create a disincentive for
unions to extend their organizing efforts beyond those workers
covered by the Act. Unions no longer needed wide public sup-
port to win the right to bargain with employers.9 4 The federal
election machinery was a shortcut that allowed them to bypass
this former source of organizational strength. Additionally, there
was an incentive to concentrate membership enrollment on
those workers who were covered by the Act, since recognition for
these workers could be obtained through federal intervention at
91. Ratner, supra note 25, at 307.
92. For a description of the effect of the coordination of all unions in the city to
virtually shut down business until their demands were met, see R. BOYER & H. MORALS,
supra note 26, at 282-89.
93. In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)), amendments to the NLRA explicitly prohibited such manifes-
tations of labor solidarity as the secondary boycott and hot cargo agreements. See supra
note 101.
94. Where previously a union would have to force an employer to recognize it, often
requiring long strikes or other demonstrations of ability to apply political or economic
pressure (both of which often entailed solicitation of outside help), the union could now
obtain the same results through a petition to the NLRB. The only thing that was re-
quired was sufficient membership authorizations from the designated workforce.
516 [Vol. V
NOTES
a much lower cost in organization resources.95
In effect, passage of the NLRA made it advantageous in the
short run for labor to narrow its sights, and consequently its po-
tential base. In the long run, this has the potential to be a "fatal
flaw" to organized labor itself, as the gap between the wages and
conditions of organized and unorganized workers has made the
latter an ever present source of "scab labor.""
Once organized labor's efforts were focused towards and de-
pendent upon the use of governmental apparatus, the "tighten-
ing" of the apparatus and the restrictions it placed on labor's
activities were a forseeable "next step." In 1947, the Taft-Hart-
ley amendments to the NLRA were passed in a cold-war atmo-
sphere where labor was once again being depicted as an anti-
American force. ' 4,600,000 workers had gone out on strike in
1946, dissatisfied with returning from World War II to wage
freezes and unemployment.98 The stated purpose of Taft-Hart-
ley was to make labor laws "two-sided"'9 9 through outlawing
many of the activities that had been used by labor historically to
win the "protection" of the laws in the first place.
Section 158 of the NLRA was amended to provide for in-
junctive relief against unions for violations of government-im-
posed sixty day cooling-off periods during which strikes could be
prohibited. 0  Mass picketing, secondary boycotts, hot cargo
agreements and contributions by unions to political campaigns
were also outlawed. 1" In addition, recognition strikes were pro-
95. While this might have been true initially, and in fact accounted for a great up-
surge in union activity immediately following passage of the NLRA, unions today are
finding it increasingly expensive to wage a successful election. Management employs va-
rious strategies in countering union efforts. Unions have had not only to meet these stra-
tegic counteroffensives, but to go back to some of the traditional union practices of seek-
ing public support for their demands. See BNA REPORT, supra note 4, at 4-5.
96. See supra note 19.
97. R. BOYER & H. MORAIS, supra note 26, at 343.
98. Id. at 344.
99. Historical Note to the 1947 Amendment describes the purpose of the amendment
as to "restate the declaration of policy and make the finding and policy of this sub-
chapter 'two-sided.'" 29 U.S.C. § 151.
100. It was through this provision that the government enjoined the recent Long Is-
land Railroad Strike.
101. Secondary boycotts are conducted for the purpose of coercing or influencing cus-
tomers, patrons or suppliers to withdraw their business relations from an employer that
is under attack by a union. It can also involve refusal to work for, purchase from or
handle products of a secondary employer with whom a union has no dispute, for the
1988]
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scribed except where the union was already certified by the
NLRB. 10 2 Employers could seek both injunctive relief and dam-
ages for these activities. This, in effect, affirmatively rescinded
the protection of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition
against injunctions directed at labor activities, 10 3 and reinsti-
tuted federal judicial jurisdiction.
Taft-Hartley signaled the beginning of another "red-bait-
ing''104 campaign. It was soon followed by passage of the McCar-
purpose of forcing him to stop doing business with the primary employer. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1212 (5th ed. 1979). A hot cargo agreement is a voluntary agreement between
a union and a neutral employer whereby the latter agrees to exert pressure on another
employer with whom the union has a dispute. Id. at 665.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7). It would, however, seem that if the NLRB "certified" a
union to bargain, it would be unnecessary to strike. This has not been the case in
practice.
103. This was true at least as applied to workers "covered" by the NLRA. In Corpo-
rate Printing Co. v. N.Y. Typographical Union, 555 F.2d 18 (1977), the court ruled that
managerial workers excluded from NLRA were still protected by Norris-LaGuardia. It
said that while the employer could discharge or refuse to bargain with the employees
without committing an NLRA "unfair labor practice," he could not get a court injunc-
tion if the union's activities constituted a "labor dispute." It is, however, less clear
whether Norris-LaGuardia's protection extends to "concerted actions" such as secondary
(or even primary) boycotts conducted by independent contractors. The Sherman Anti-
trust Act has recently been invoked against a group of physicians in Arizona who were
attempting to boycott participation in a Blue Cross "preferred provider organization"
(PPO), based on their dissatisfaction with terms of the contracts that Blue Cross was
asking them to sign. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, N. Y. Times, Mar.
10, 1984, § 4, at 3. Additionally, the status of workers who are considered to be covered
by NLRB jurisdiction but are denied certification by the NLRB is still unclear. In the
case of medical "housestaff" attempting to win recognition to bargain with non-profit
hospitals, a court, in Physicians Housestaff v. Murphy 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
refused to review an NLRB decision that housestaff were primarily students and thus
not eligible as "employees under the Act" to be recognized. In an NLRB decision enti-
tled Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 NLRB 57 (1976), the NLRB asserted jurisdiction
over the workplace (since non-profit hospitals had been recently included in the NLRA's
definition of "employer") but refused certification. When the organization, the Commit-
tee of Interns and Residents (CIR), then applied to the New York State Public Employ-
ees Relation Board (PERB), PERB found them to be employees under New York State
law and certified them. The hospital obtained an injunction against CIR and PERB on
the grounds that the NLRB decision was "pre-emptive." NLRB v. Committee of Interns
& Residents, 566 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1977). The NLRB has consistently refused to grant
recognition to these workers, yet the courts have likewise denied them the ability to seek
other means of recognition. (It was alleged in a 1980 housestaff case that these workers
earn approximately $10,000 a year for a 70-100 hour week, or $1.92-$2.74 per hour. How-
ever, as "professional" employees, they are exempted from federal minimum wage and
maximum hour laws.)
104. "The practice of denouncing groups or individuals as communist or sympathetic
to communism, often with little evidence." FUNK & WAGNALLS STANDARD COLLEGE Dic-
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ran Internal Security Act of 1950.115 Under the latter, officers of
"non-communist organizations" which had, in the opinion of the
Subversive Activity Control Board, "parallel aims" to those of
the Communist Party, had to register as leaders of "communist
fronts." Failure to do so was punishable by a prison term. The
fear of falling within the vague definition of communist fronts
led many within the labor movement to call for the expulsion of
some of their own leaders who had reputations for labor mili-
tancy.108 The Internal Security Act was succeeded in 1952 by the
McCarran-Walters Immigration Act which required some three
million non-citizens to carry registration cards. Additionally,
some eleven million naturalized citizens were threatened with
denaturalization and deportation if they were found to be
subversive.
o107
Towards the end of what is known as the "McCarthy
era,"' 0 8 the final major addition to the NLRA was passed in the
form of the National Labor-Management Reporting and Disclos-
ure Act (NLMRDA).109 Unlike previous amendments to federal
labor law such as Taft-Hartley, this Act does not limit its reach
to organizations of workers who are covered by NLRA.1 ° It re-
quires the registering of all labor associations, the bonding of
union "employees,"' and the submission of extensive financial
reports which must include sources of contributions.' Whether
or not a particular labor association is entitled to or seeks fed-
TIONARY 1127 (1968).
105. ch. 447, 56 Stat. 390 (1942), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-835, (1982).
106. R. BOYER & H. MORAlS, supra note 26, at 368-69.
107. Id. A Transport Workers Union official was negotiating a strike settlement for
Long Island bus drivers when immigration agents arrested him at the bargaining table
and held him at Ellis Island for deportation to Canada.
108. "McCarthyism" is defined as "[tihe practice of making public and sensational
accusations of disloyalty or corruption, usually with little or no proof or with doubtful
evidence." FUNK & WAGNALLS, supra note 104, at 838. It is thus unnecessary to obtain
objective legal conviction or even charges, as the desired effect is in public reaction. For
additional discussion of the effect of this phenomenon on labor, see R. BOYER & H.
MORAIS, supra note 26, at 373-78.
109. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-402, 411-415,
431-441, 461-466, 481-483, 501-504, 521-531 (1982)).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 402(i),(j).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 432.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 431. Compare NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), where local
officials were considered to have "chilled" first amendment rights of freedom of associa-
tion by requiring disclosure of membership and contribution lists of the local NAACP.
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eral recognition or engages in other NLRA-covered activities,
any organization that exists "for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers" can be enjoined from activities
under this Act. 113
IV. FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR STANDARDS
In addition to the above laws governing unions themselves and
the employer-employee relationship, the other major field of fed-
eral labor legislation is the "protective" laws which regulate
things like minimum wage, maximum hours, equal pay and oc-
cupational health and safety standards. The primary law in this
field, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,"11 was passed after
previous attempts to set such standards had been held
unconstitutional.1 5
The FLSA set minimum wage and maximum hours for
workers "engaged in commerce or in production of goods for
commerce."" 6 It excluded all others, and when originally passed,
specifically excluded all agricultural workers, domestic workers,
113. 29 U.S.C. § 402(i). See, e.g., Marshall v. Eastern Farm Workers Ass'n., No. 76
Civ. 167 (E.D.N.Y. Apr., 1979) (use of NLMRDA action against a local farm worker asso-
ciation in Suffolk County, New York). There has also been a recent proposal by the
President's Commission on Organized Crime that unions that are found to be "corrupt"
be put into receivership under direct federal control. N. Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, § 1, at
19. (This is somewhat ironic considering the recent extensive prosecution by U.S. Attor-
ney Rudolph Giuliani against corrupt government officials under RICO and other anti-
corruption statutes.)
114. ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
115. See, e.g., the Court's treatment of the Child Labor Act, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675
(1916), in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). The Act prohibited the interstate
shipment of goods produced by child labor and claimed authority to do so under the
Commerce Clause of Article I, § 5 of the U.S. Constitution. In holding the Act unconsti-
tutional, the Court said:
In some of the states laws have been passed fixing minimum wages for
women, in others the local law regulates the hours of labor of women in various
employments. Business done in such States may be at an economic disadvantage
when compared with States which have no such regulations; surely this fact does
not give Congress the power to deny transportation in interstate commerce to
those who carry on business where the hours of labor and rate of compensation
for women have not been fixed by a standard in use in other States and ap-
proved by Congress.
247 U.S. at 273.
The court subsequently reversed its position on this, and, in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), found the Fair Labor Standards Act to be a constitutional exercise of
Congress' power to regulate commerce.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 202.
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government employees, independent contractors and those em-
ployed by small businesses.11 Unlike the NLRA, the FLSA pro-
vided no administrative apparatus through which complaints
could be aired.11 It was geared towards enforcement through the
courts, requiring that the individual worker have personal access
to legal assistance in order to exercise any rights under the
act." 9 While the FLSA has been amended over the years to in-
clude agricultural workers,120 domestic workers, 21 and govern-
ment employees,1 22 there are many additional categories that,
though not specifically listed in the Act itself, have been held in
court decisions to be outside of its scope. 23
There are two important points to bear in mind in examin-
ing the status of FLSA coverage. First, there is a large gap be-
tween black letter coverage and reality. This becomes clear
through examination of various efforts by workers to enforce
these "rights."' 24 Second, a worker who is covered by the mini-
mum wage, working forty hours a week, fifty-two weeks per year,
117. 29 U.S.C. § 203. See also L. WEINER, supra note 2, at 8.
118. L. WEINER, supra note 2, at 3-4.
119. In a recent report issued jointly by the American Civil Liberties Union and the
American Friends Service Committee, National Immigration & Alien Rights Project, The
Hands That Feed Us (April, 1986) [hereinafter ACLU Report], the authors list lack of
access to legal services as one of the main obstacles faced by migrant farm workers in
Florida in trying to obtain legal redress under the few laws that cover them. The report,
at page 5, states:
When laws protecting farm workers are ignored, alien farm workers ...
have little access to the legal system. Few if any can afford private attorneys.
There are only a small number of charitably-funded legal services in the state.
Moreover, the LSC (Legal Services Corporation), established by Congress in
1974 to provide legal assistance for the indigent in civil matters, is specifically
prohibited from funding representation of undocumented aliens or H-2 workers.
Id. at 5.
Even if the specific restriction did not exist, funds for LSC programs have been severely
cut in the past seven years under the current administration.
120. L. WEINER, supra note 2, at 122. Agricultural workers are only covered under the
current law if the employer uses five hundred "man hours" of labor in a calendar quar-
ter. Additionally, until 1978, the minimum wage for farm workers was lower than for
other workers. Id. at 122-25.
121. Id. at 134. See also infra note 152.
122. L. WEINER, supra note 2, at 104.
123. For example, retail and service workers, id. at 125, outside salesmen, id. at 113,
seasonal workers, id. at 112, 130, fishing industry workers, id. at 138, students, the handi-
capped, and those employed in "sheltered workshops." 29 U.S.C. § 214.
124. The discussion that follows outlines some of the realities involved in attempting
to enforce the provisions of FLSA and other laws.
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is receiving $6968 annually before taxes. The poverty level for a
family of four in the U.S. is $11,000 a year. 125 In reality, for
many workers who are unorganized either through lack of NLRA
recognition or simply through lack of an available organizational
vehicle, the minimum wage is the maximum wage. Further, the
vast majority of these workers have no health benefits or any
other supplemental protection against the effects of an inade-
quate wage. 126
V. ATTEMPTS BY UNRECOGNIZED WORKERS
TO OBTAIN LEGAL REDRESS
It is deceptive to attempt to understand coverage of these
labor laws (i.e., who is and isn't included and to what they're
entitled) outside of the history of actual efforts of various cate-
gories of workers to exercise their rights under these laws. Public
employees, for instance, have traditionally been excluded from
labor laws. They have only recently been included under
FLSA. 127 Only recently, too, have many states passed laws grant-
ing them collective bargaining rights. Even when given limited
bargaining rights, all federal and most state and local employees
are specifically prohibited from engaging in job actions or other
concerted activities.12s Federal employees are additionally for-
125. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (November 1986). (For a single individual, the fig-
ure is $5,360.)
126. Former HEW Secretary Joseph Califano has just proposed that the federal gov-
ernment pass a "minimum health care" law, similar to the minimum wage law. In his
testimony before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, Califano esti-
mated that some 37,000,000 workers lack any kind of health insurance, an increase of
37% between 1980 and 1985. Additionally, current Medicaid regulations deny benefits to
anyone between the ages of 21 and 65 who is neither disabled for at least twelve months
nor suffering from an illness requiring hospitalization, if that person is not also on wel-
fare. In other words, the "working poor" are no longer eligible for Medicaid. Long Island
Farmworker, Feb., 1987, at 3, col. 1.
127. This inclusion, at first held to be unconstitutional in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), was only recently reinstated. See also ILO REPORT, supra
note 1, at 14, discussing international policies regarding inclusion of public service work-
ers in collective bargaining laws.
128. Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(A) (1978). Also, under §
7116(b)(7)(B), a union representing federal employees must take affirmative action to
prevent or stop a strike by its members. The law was invoked as part of the destruction
of the Air Traffic Controller's union (PATCO) after its members went on strike. The
union was at first fined, then all air traffic controllers still on strike were fired, and finally
the union was stripped of all recognition to bargain for its members. N. Y. Times, Aug.
NOTES
bidden to participate in "political campaigns" by the Hatch
Act.129 According to recent Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
figures, there are almost three million federal employees.13 ° This
figure most likely excludes workers in federal job training pro-
grams3 since, for most other purposes, they are not considered
"civil service" employees.
State employees and employees of "political subdivisions"
have historically been denied collective bargaining and other leg-
islative protection under federal laws. This exclusion is based
both on "federalism" concerns' 32 and on the fact that their ac-
tivities have not been considered to "affect commerce." BLS es-
timates their number at 13.5 million.'33 Various attempts by
these workers to assert a recognition right under the first and
fourteenth amendments have been rejected by the courts. In
1972, a federal judge, in Richmond Educational Association v.
Crockford,13  held that a refusal by the government to meet
with, bargain with or recognize an association of its employees
might be found to chill first amendment rights. However, in
Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315,135 the
Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that local and
state governments have no constitutional duty to recognize or
bargain with their employees absent a self-imposed duty.
While most states now have some form of public employee
bargaining mechanism,13 these generally prohibit any exercise
of leverage through "concerted labor action." As an alternative
to strikes, these laws typically allow public employee associa-
tions, after being "certified" by some form of administrative
16, 1981, § IV, at 5.
129. Hatch Political Activity Act, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1503,
7324-7327 (1982).
130. Current Labor Statistics, supra note 2, at 80.
131. For example, CETA, Job Corps, etc. See infra text accompanying note 278.
132. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
133. Current Labor Statistics, supra note 2, at 80. As those with respect to federal
employees, these figures are dubious at best, particularly in light of evidence that in
some cities, more than 10% of the workforce actually performing government tasks are
not considered "employees." See infra text accompanying notes 292-94.
134. 55 F.R.D. 362 (E.D. Va. 1972).
135. 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
136. See, e.g., New York's Taylor Law, N.Y. CIv. SER. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney
1976), and California's Myer-Milius-Brown Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3512-3524 (West
1971).
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board, to "meet and confer" with government officials. 137 There
is generally no recourse if their demands are rejected. In some
cases, provision is made for mediation, generally by a govern-
ment-appointed panel, with the highest legislative body in the
locality being required to approve its decision. 13
Despite a common presumption that government employees
are both well paid and well protected by civil service and other
regulations, 13 9 it appears that this may not be universally true.
One of the more significant challenges to the 1974 amendments
to the FLSA arose in 1976 in a suit by the League of Cities on
behalf of various member states and municipalities nationally.
In National League of Cities v. Usery,4 0 the plaintiffs claimed
that application of minimum wage and overtime provisions of
the FLSA to "political subdivisions" would "intrude on the
state's performance of essential government functions."' The
main contention of the League was that the increased financial
burden of paying their employees at the level required by fed-
eral standards would cripple them economically. California alone
estimated that enforcement of the Act against its cities would
increase its budget by between eight and sixteen million
dollars.'"2
In ruling that the FLSA amendments in question were un-
constitutional, the court reasoned that:
[Though it may] be desirable that the states, just as pri-
vate employers, comply with these minimum wage re-
quirements. . .[t]he state might wish to employ persons
with little or no training, or those who wish to work on a
casual basis, or those who for some other reason do not
possess minimum employment requirements, and pay-
them less than the federally prescribed minimum wage. 4 3
137. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. SER. LAW § 210.
138. See, e.g., New York, N.Y. Collective Bargaining Law §§ 1173-1177.0 (1967).
139. Therefore less in need of leverage available through strikes and other job
actions.
140. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
141. Id. at 839.
142. Id. at 846.
143. Id. at 848. Compare this to the stated policy behind the passage of FLSA origi-
nally, i.e., to insure the "maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency and general well being of workers." This purpose is not any less rele-
vant if a worker is "untrained," assuming arguendo that lack of training is the real rea-
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VI. DOMESTIC WORKERS
It was not just the 13.5 million "civil service" workers that
were affected by the National League of Cities decision. At the
same time, a suit was going through the courts in California
challenging the failure of California and various of its counties
to pay minimum wage to workers hired under the state's Home-
maker-Chore program.144 This program, which is primarily fed-
erally funded, though administered by the states, provides in-
home domestic services to aged and disabled recipients of Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI).1'5
In Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, "6
the plaintiffs, who were workers employed through the Home-
maker-Chore Program, claimed that the county and state agen-
cies were joint employers, each exerting control over the wages
and conditions of work. They were suing to enforce provisions of
FLSA which had just recently been added to include both do-
mestic workers and government employees. 14 7 While the suit was
in progress, League of Cities was decided, and the Bonnette de-
fendants immediately tried to get the case dismissed. They ar-
gued that if the government was found to be the employer, 48
son an employer, public or otherwise, would want to avoid paying minimum wage. The
same "lack of training" criterion is being advanced to justify the proposal that private
employers located in "urban enterprise zones," see supra note 18, be allowed to waive
payment of minimum wage.
144. Under the Homemaker-Chore Program, one of the services eligible to receive
federal reimbursement under Title XX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-
1397f (1982), states (generally through local county administration) provide in-home do-
mestic help to aged, blind and disabled welfare recipients. Various means are employed
for provision of these services, including providing cash grants to the recipients so they
can hire their own workers; use of civil service workers to provide the services; and use of
a contracted agency or "vender" who employs workers to provide the services authorized
by the counties.
145. Supplemental Security Income is a federally mandated program, administered
by each state, that provides for supplemental income to aged, blind or disabled individu-
als whose income is below the federal standard (currently about $500 per month for a
single individual). SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid and for Title
XX services such as in-home care. Many of these recipients are themselves "unrecog-
nized workers" for whom no social security payments were made while they were work-
ing, so that they are now reliant on welfare in their old age.
146. 525 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
147. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
148. The governments involved (California and various counties) vehemently denied
being the employer, claiming instead that the recipients were the employers. There are
an estimated 70,000 homemaker-chore workers in California. The state spelled out a
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the workers were not entitled to minimum wage under the
League of Cities holding. If the workers were found to be em-
ployed instead by the individual recipients, they might be enti-
tled to minimum wage as domestic workers but in that case, the
government claimed, it was not a proper defendant. The court,
in granting relief to the plaintiffs, held that the county and state
were joint employers with recipients and that, in any case, the
League of Cities holding was inapplicable since provision of
homemaker-chore services was not an "integral function" of
government.149
League of Cities has since been overturned by the Supreme
Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity.so Even though government "employees" are now protected
by minimum wage, the larger problem of identifying an em-
ployer-employee relationship and enforcing any ensuing rights
remains. It seems apparent that the government's opposition to
the claims of the Bonnette plaintiffs was based less on avoidance
of the minimum wage payment,' than on avoidance of the em-
ployer relationship. As can be seen in subsequent cases filed
against cities and states nationally over similar "quasi-govern-
choice of methods for the counties to provide the mandated services, supra note 144,
after a 1971 IRS ruling in San Diego that these workers were not "independent contrac-
tors" as the state had originally tried to claim. At the time of the IRS decision, most
counties sent the checks directly to the worker to pay for the services, but denied being
the employer. The IRS ruled that under this system, the workers were "county employ-
ees" for the purpose of determining payment of social security and other taxes. After
this, of the three service delivery methods considered "acceptable" by the state, most
counties chose to send the check to the recipient so that the recipient would be the
"employer." This removed from the Government all liability for fringe benefits. The re-
cipient, however, had no control over the hours the worker was authorized to work, the
pay the worker was to receive, or the tasks that were approved to be performed. There
was also no payment of any Workers' Compensation or unemployment benifits, since the
county denied being the employer and the recipient had neither the money nor the
mechanism to pay. Minimum wage enforcement was equally difficult since, if the pay was
inadequate, the recipient had no way of increasing it. An internal memo from San Joa-
quin County in 1976 estimated that "wages" paid to these workers under the cash grant
method ranged from $.14 to $2.00 an hour.
149. Bonnette, 525 F. Supp. at 138-39. See also supra notes 140-43 and accompany-
ing text.
150. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
151. The amount in question in the Bonnette case was less than $18,500 total, and a
state minimum wage law specifically covering both state and local government employees
and domestic workers had already been passed by the time the case reached the courts,
so future compliance with federal standards was moot. Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1465, 1468.
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mental" programs, this question is far from resolved.152
Additionally, while the Garcia decision has, at least on pa-
per, established the right of government employees to the mini-
mum wage, the "political subdivision" exception remains as far
as collective bargaining rights under federal laws are con-
cerned. 153 As stated by the court in Smith v. Arkansas State
Highway Employees Local 1315, 5" there is neither a constitu-
tional nor statutory duty for state and local governments to bar-
gain, in the absence of a state law. However, even where a state
bargaining law is in place, there is no guarantee that a particular
category of public employee will be recognized, particularly
when the employment relationship is tenuous. 155 Thus, in Cardo
v. Lakeland School Dist.,56 the federal district court upheld a
state administrative decision 57 excluding per diem teachers
from bargaining with the school district. It reasoned that since
there was a rational basis for the distinction, 5 a there was no rea-
son to conclude that the exclusion violated equal protection as
the teachers charged. It went on to state that since collective
bargaining was not a "fundamental right," and since "casual" or
"temporary" workers were not a "suspect class," strict scrutiny
152. In McClune v. Oregon, 643 F. Supp. 1444 (1986), a similar program in Oregon
included regulations allowing payment of $1.55 an hour under the "companion" excep-
tion to the FLSA minimum wage for domestic workers. (Under the 1974 amendments
which provided domestic workers with FLSA coverage for the first time, "nursing com-
panions and babysitters" were excepted.) In McClune, the court accepted the state's pre-
mise that cleaning a disabled recipient, doing his laundry and cooking, making beds, etc.,
was companionship. Despite finding, as the Bonnette court did, that the state was joint
employer with the recipient (and thus a proper defendant), the McClune court chose to
allow the private household worker exception. There is no such exception for public
employees.
153. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
154. 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
155. For example, where the work is temporary or part-time, or the worker is classi-
fied as a "trainee." Here the status of the employment relationship is not well defined,
and the courts have not always been willing to find the worker an "employee of an em-
ployer." See infra text accompanying notes 253-94.
156. 592 F. Supp. 765 (1984).
157. The administrative agency involved was PERB (Public Employee Relations
Board). See supra note 103.
158. The 1981 amendment to New York's Taylor Law gave per diem teachers collec-
tive bargaining rights only if they could show that they had received reasonable assur-
ance of continued employment. This would seem to be a circuitous condition in that it
would largely be through bargaining that they could receive such assurance.
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would not be applied.15 '
In another case involving domestic workers hired through
government programs, a petition was filed with New York City's
Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB) in 1980 on behalf of work-
ers employed in the city's Attendant Care Program.6 0 The goal
of the petition, brought jointly by two public employee un-
ions,161 was to win the right to represent some 15,000 workers
hired to care for the city's aged and disabled SSI recipients. A
similar petition, filed in 1978, had been rejected on technical
grounds.'62 This time, the OCB admitted that the workers were
"employees" and not independent contractors as the city had
originally claimed. However, now the OCB used the fact that the
city had decided in the interim to vendorize services' 63 to deny
jurisdiction. Citing Ankh Services Inc.,6 the OCB held that the
workers were more likely within the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board. 6 5
The OCB did note in passing:
[T]he realities of a contractually established rate for City
reimbursement of the vendors might limit sharply the
scope of negotiations between the vendors and a union of
their employees on economic issues such as wages, and
consequently that the vendors [might] not be able to
meet the standard of ability to engage in meaningful col-
159. The court admitted that there was a wide disparity of pay, but said that eco-
nomic position alone did not make the class "suspect." Cardo, 592 F. Supp at 771. No
federal court has found "poverty" to be a "suspect class" for the purpose of equal protec-
tion, absent the presence of a "fundamental right" being threatened. This is despite the
obvious discriminatory treatment proffered to those without money. Several state courts
(e.g., California's, in Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971)) have
attempted to apply strict scrutiny to discrimination based on economic status, but on
the federal level, in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the
Supreme Court ruled otherwise.
160. District Council 37 v. City of New York, OCB Decision No. 20-80 (July 17,
1980).
161. District Council 37 and Service Employees International Union (SEIU) are the
two main labor organizations representing New York City employees.
162. One of the unions had failed to meet "proof of interest" requirements by pro-
ducing a sufficient number of signed authorizations. See OCB Decision No. 61-78 (Nov.
30, 1978).
163. On November 15, 1979, the New York City Board of Estimate approved forty-
two "purchase of service" contracts with private agencies. OCB Decision No. 20-80, at 7.
164. 243 N.L.R.B. 478 (1979).
165. As "employees of an employer" under NLRA. Id.
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lective bargaining negotiations.'
However, the OCB dismissed this concern by observing that the
difference between the contract rate of reimbursement to the
vendors ($4.15 an hour) and the minimum rate required by the
city to be paid to the worker ($3.35 an hour) was "sufficient" to
provide room for the vendor to negotiate. The OCB also assured
itself that the vendor was free to renegotiate yearly with the city
should the union successfully press for more money. 1 7
The issue of restriction on a government subcontractor's
ability to engage in meaningful negotiations with workers was
litigated in California in 1978. In San Francisco v. California,
one vendor who had a substantial wage and fringe benefit agree-
ment with its employees was chosen by the city to provide ser-
vices under the Homemaker-Chore Program. The state rejected
the city's contract with the vendor on review, stating that it ex-
ceeded the limits of allowable costs set by the state, and ordered
the city to contract with a vendor paying lower wages. The court
upheld the state's decision.'
This legal football of whether the government is the em-
ployer of these workers continues to be thrown around in courts.
The reality is that the governments involved, through use of
subcontracting or some other intermediary between them and
the workers, have avoided responsibility both to bargain and to
pay the workers a living wage and adequate benefits. Attendant
care workers fall into the cracks of two major exceptions to the
labor laws: government employees and private household work-
ers. They may also be falling into the cracks of official labor sta-
tistics. Most government agencies have refused to count them as
government employees. The Bureau of Labor Statistics lists only
1,256,000 domestic workers nationally as being employed in
166. District Council 37 v. City of New York, OCB Decision No. 20-80, at 29. The
"standard of ability" test is used by NLRB to determine if a potential employer who is
under contract with a government agency will fall under the "political subdivision" ex-
ception. If too much control over conditions of work, wages, etc. is exerted by the govern-
ment agency, the private contractor may be found to fall within this exception. Private
nursing homes which are funded primarily through Medicare and Medicaid payments
have tried to use this same argument in either refusing to bargain or claiming an inabil-
ity to meet wage demands. Ankh Services, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 478 (1979).
167. The contract also included an 18% ceiling on fringe benefits that could be paid
to the worker (about 60 cents an hour).
168. 87 Cal.App.3d 959, 151 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1978).
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1986.69 It is unlikely that the 70,000 attendant care workers in
California or the 15,500 workers in New York City's program are
included in this figure.1 70 It is also common for private employ-
ers of domestic workers to fail to report that employment.
17 1
Even when the employer is the government, it is common that
no social security or other deductions are paid, adding further to
the dubiousness of their reported numbers.1 71 Whatever the ac-
tual figure, the fact that these workers are scattered in private
homes and often don't come into contact with other workers
makes organization difficult, even if "recognition" were availa-
ble. The focus by the few organizations that have attempted to
organize household workers has therefore naturally fallen on the
attendant care programs, since there is at least a semblance of
an "employer" to whom grievances can be collectively addressed.
It is in this context that an organizing drive was begun in
1973 by the California Homemakers Association (CHA) 7 a
CHA's membership constituency includes both freelance domes-
tics and workers employed in the county-run Homemaker Chore
Program. After an intensive membership drive, CHA presented
a demand for recognition to bargain for a contract to the County
of Sacramento in 1974.74 The county's initial response was to
deny being the employer of the workers and to declare them to
be "independent contractors. ' 175 However, after a series of con-
169. Current Labor Statistics, supra note 2, at 80.
170. For example, despite the fact that 70,000 workers (who are not considered "gov-
ernment employees") are employed as domestics in California's Homemaker-Chore Pro-
gram, the official California census for 1970 lists the number of domestic workers state-
wide as 978. See Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 489 F. Supp. 282, 306
(1980).
171. If an employer pays a particular worker less than $50 per quarter, he is not re-
quired to pay social security. Many freelance domestics who work for several employers
fall under this exemption.
172. In California, it was not until six counties were faced with active organizing
drives of attendant care workers who were demanding fringe benefits and threatening
law suits that the state legislature began directing payment of social security and other
required taxes for these workers.
173. California Homemakers Association is an all-volunteer membership association
run on a "mutual benefit" principle. Its members include both domestic and attendant
care workers and the aged, blind and disabled recipients who receive care in the pro-
gram. Unemployed workers are also represented.
174. Appellant's Opening Brief at 8, California Homemaker Ass'n v. County of Sacra-
mento, No. 3 Civ. 17640 & 18810 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1981).
175. One county official expressed concern that an agreement to negotiate with a rep-
resentative of "independent contractors" might violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. See
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frontations between the workers, the recipients, 176  and the
county, the Sacramento Board of Supervisors passed a resolu-
tion recognizing CHA as the representative of these "indepen-
dent contractors" and agreeing to negotiate contracts that would
cover the individual workers.177 In consideration of this, CHA
agreed not to file a lawsuit it was preparing which sought a dec-
laration of the employer status.'7 8 Negotiation sessions were held
over a two year period. During this time, the Board members
began meeting in closed session to discuss ways of backing out of
the agreement. Several months later, the Board unilaterally re-
scinded the recognition and repudiated any tentative agree-
ments reached during negotiations. 179
CHA filed suit in state court alleging breach of contract,
fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and violation of
also supra note 148.
176. CHA's inclusion of the recipients in its membership was based on the fact that
contrary to the assertion by the county that the recipients were the employers, and
therefore had interests adverse to the workers, the reality of the situation
was otherwise.
177. Board of Supervisors of the County of Sacramento, State of California, Res. 74-
230, March 11, 1974.
178. The question of whether the county would be found to be the employer was
actively being raised in other counties as well. While the Sacramento activities
progressed, CHA members in Santa Cruz County filed a complaint with the state Labor
Commissioner under California Labor Code §§ 204, 207, 215, 227. They charged in the
complaint that the county's payment of monthly checks to the recipients violated, among
other things, state law regarding pay periods. Under the Code, "government employees"
could be paid on a monthly basis. Private employees (including domestic workers) had to
be paid bi-weekly. The complaint stated in the alternative that either the workers were
government employees (and thus entitled to social security, fringe benefits, etc.) or they
were private domestic workers (and thus entitled to bi-weekly pay). The Labor Commis-
sioner at first tried to discourage pursuit of the complaint on the grounds that if he ruled
the workers were employees of the recipients, the recipients would be subjected to fines.
When the recipients joined the workers in their complaint, the matter was "taken under
consideration." Two months later the Commissioner declared that the county was the
employer therefore placing the issue "beyond his jurisdiction." CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 204,
207, 215, 227 (West 1971).
179. CHA became aware of this through a letter sent by one of the Supervisors. In it,
he expressed concern that the meetings were in violation of state law requiring all "pub-
lic business" to be conducted in open meetings. Under California's Brown Act, CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 5450-5461 (West 1971), the only possible exception to this open meeting re-
quirement that would have applied to the county's conduct in this case was for when the
Board was meeting to discuss negotiations with "county employees," an exception that
the county could not claim here in view of their position on employer status. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 50-51, California Homemaker Ass'n v. County of Sacramento, No. 3
Civ. 18810 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1981).
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both due process and equal protection. CHA's position was that
even in the absence of a statutory right to bargain, promises
made by a government body in response to organizing efforts
and to use of the "political" process by citizens should be en-
forceable, with good faith performance by the government re-
quired.'80 Additionally, CHA contended that the workers were
entitled to due process before the Board resolution and subse-
quent agreements could be rescinded, since these promises con-
stituted a property right that had accrued.18 ' After several years
of attempts by the county to have the complaint dismissed for
failure to state a claim, the trial court acceded, and decided as a
matter of law that the workers had no enforceable rights.8 2 The
California Court of Appeals, in an opinion stamped "not for
publication," upheld the lower court's decision. One of the ap-
pellate justices labelled the effort "frivilous," while another
stated that the issue was more appropriate for the legislature.8 3
During the course of CHA's fight in California, the state leg-
islature voted to extend the minimum wage to domestic work-
ers, 8 4 and later specifically included attendant care workers in
the state's Workers' Compensation and Unemployment pro-
grams (while continuing to claim that they were not the em-
ployer). Previously, the only "unemployment" insurance that at-
tendant care workers had was county welfare programs."8 5
180. If statutory collective bargaining rights were not available, and CHA had not
been dealing with the county "qua employer," then it had been dealing with it "qua
public official," and, CHA argued, just as high a "good faith" standard should be ex-
pected. Appellant's Opening Brief at 52, No. 3 Civ. 18810.
181. CHA claimed their situation was analogous to that of plaintiffs in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8. (1970), where once a government had conferred a benefit on
a recipient, that benefit became a "property right" entitling the recipient to a termina-
tion hearing. Appellant's Opening Brief at 16-20, No. 3 Civ. 18810.
182. No. 3 Civ. 17640 & 18810.
183. This was ironic since it had been the local equivalent of "legislature" that had
just prevailed in rescinding the promises it had made in the course of CHA's attempt to
use the "political process."
184. See supra note 151.
185. In a committee report recommending passage of this benefit bill, it was noted
that voluntary extension by the state of these benfits was preferable to the alternative of
forcing "certain employee groups" representing these workers to press for these benefits
through litigation. Previously, the only "unemployment insurance" available to these
workers was welfare. In fact, raising the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and General Assistance grant level had been part of CHA's original demands,
based on this fact.
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VII. FARMWORKERS
The problems faced by these attendant care workers in as-
serting their rights under various laws are not dissimilar from
those facing another category of unrecognized worker.
Farmworkers, like domestic workers, are also handicapped in
their efforts to organize, by lack of a centralized workplace or
easily identifiable employer. They too have been traditionally
excluded both from the laws and existing organizational vehi-
cles. In 1960, Edward R. Murrow portrayed the conditions of mi-
grant farm workers in Florida in Harvest of Shame, an award-
winning documentary that was televised nationally.1 8' Though
numerous laws that were meant to "deal with" the problem were
passed soon after this exposure, ' conditions in the fields and
migrant camps have not significantly changed since that time.
There are several explanations for this. One is that while
much of the public's attention has been focused on the crew
chief system as "the problem," ' it is only one of many devices
employed by large growers and agribusiness to maintain control
over farm workers. The crew chief system, much like vendorizing
in the homemaker-chore programs, is designed to serve as a
buffer between the worker and the true employer. The crew
chiefs are generally paid by the owners to procure the needed
number of workers. The crew chiefs in turn pay the farm work-
ers after deducting for initial transportation costs and for other
goods or services they provide.189 This creates a debtor-creditor
186. Harvest of Shame (Dec. 4, 1960) was one of the earliest "T.V. documentaries"
that popularized this kind of investigative reporting. In commentary following the show,
a congressman pledged that he "would not rest" until the conditions had changed. The
show was aired again in the 1980s, and commentary at that time was on the fact that
things had not changed. See, e.g., ACLU REPORT, supra note. 119, describing current
conditions faced by Florida's migrant farm workers. See also Christian Science Monitor,
Apr. 11, 1986, at 3. It was immediately after national and international exposure gener-
ated by this documentary that several federal farm worker bills were introduced. Murrow
and several government officials attempted to prevent it from being aired on the BBC in
England, based on the embarrassment it would cause. N. Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1961, at 1.
187. See, e.g., Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, 7 U.S.C. § 2041, as
amended by 29 U.S.C. § 1801 (1983). When the Act was amended in 1983 it was retitled
the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Act. In general, "seasonal" farm workers,
as distinguished from "migrant" farm workers, are those who live in an area year long
but work in agriculture only during the harvest or other applicable season.
188. ACLU REPORT, supra note 119, at 48, 57.
189. Id. at 48.
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relationship which can be used to maintain further control over
the worker. This relationship, for example, enables the crew
chief or employer to obtain the help of local police who are
called on to arrest workers who attempt to leave the camps with-
out paying their debts.190 In a case filed in Florida in 1980 by
hundreds of farm workers on a single camp, the workers claimed
that they were forced to continue working for weekly pay checks
amounting to five dollars, until the "debt" they had accrued was
paid.19 1
While federal law now requires crew chiefs to register their
labor camps, 92 this very "protection" can work against the in-
terest of farm workers. For example, in Suffolk County, New
York, workers were denied access to federally funded Migrant
Health clinics based on the fact that they were living on "unre-
gistered" camps. 93 Related laws governing health standards on
the camps are rarely enforced,' 9 and where they are, enforce-
ment may mean shutting down the camp altogether by the
Health Department, leaving the worker stranded with no hous-
ing at all. The fact that the migratory nature of the work makes
farm workers dependent on employer-owned housing puts farm
workers at another disadvantage not faced by other types of
workers. The owner has control not only of the wages and work-
ing conditions, but also of the living arrangements.'95 If workers
decide to take any action against an employer over the condi-
tions of work, they stand to lose their home. This may explain
190. Id. at 50.
191. See discussion of Munoz v. Saldivar, ACLU Report, supra note 119, at 50-51.
Compare this practice, which is common practice in agricultural employment, to "con-
tract labor," which was supposedly outlawed in the 19th century. See supra text accom-
panying notes 36-37. Additionally, the practice of "debt bondage," a system under which
laborers and their families are forced to work for an employer in order to pay off their
actually incurred or inherited debts, is a violation of international law since 1930. It is
commonly believed to be a problem primarily affecting workers in Southeast Asia. ILO
REPORT, supra note 1, at 67-70.
192. 29 U.S.C. § 1801.
193. Obviously, the ones that were not registered could be expected to be in the worst
condition, with decreased maintenance of health standards. See ACLU REPORT, supra
note 119, at 4. Farmworkers are 7-26 times more likely to contract parasitic diseases,
many of which are spread through unsanitary living conditions. Id.
194. Id. at 35-39.
195. For a description of the problems faced by workers in "company housing," see F.
FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 26, at 101 n.9 (citing CHAFEE, THE INQUIRING
MIND (1928)).
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why only 2% of the farm worker population is organized, even
where large numbers of them have the "advantage" of being
thrown together twenty-four hours a day.'96
This problem is exemplified by the experience of a group of
migrant workers in Suffolk County, employed by the I.M. Young
Company. These workers were hired to grade and process pota-
toes. In December, 1972, workers from two of Young's camps,
along with their crew chiefs, 97 obtained the assistance of a local
mutual benefits association, Eastern Farm Workers Association
(EFWA), in setting up informational picket lines. They were
protesting the fact that the company had been deliberately hold-
ing back work (and pay) while they waited for the price of pota-
toes to rise. Four days after the picketing began, the company
declared that the camps were closed and enlisted local police in
summarily evicting the workers. EFWA obtained a temporary
restraining order' 98 while it attempted to have the eviction de-
clared illegal under New York landlord-tenant law. The workers
claimed they had been paying "rent" in the form of deductions
from their paychecks. The New York State Court of Appeals
eventually ruled that the workers were "servants" rather than
"tenants" under state law, since their housing was an incident of
their employment, and therefore they could be legally evicted
without a hearing.'99
EFWA was able to continue the informational picket line
since they had built an extensive network of community support
that was able to provide alternative housing. This continued un-
til 1976, when, at the request of the company, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor filed suit against EFWA in federal district
court. °0 It sought an injunction against the association's activi-
ties until EFWA complied with reporting requirements under
NLMRDA.' 0 ' Though I.M. Young workers were ineligible under
196. ACLU REPORT, supra note 119, at 4.
197. It is not always the case that the interests of the crew chiefs are adverse to those
of the workers. In this case, neither the farm workers nor the crew chiefs were receiving
pay while work was being held back, and the crew chiefs incurred debt themselves
through laying out their own funds to purchase food for the workers.
198. Williams v. I.M. Young Co., No. 15770 (N.Y. 1972).
199. Id. See also Guerra v. Sprenger, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 174 (June 1986).
200. Marshall v. Eastern Farm Workers Ass'n, No. 76 Civ. 167 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1979).
201. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
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NLRA for collective bargaining recognition, 0 2 and they were
"servants" under state landlord-tenant law, the all-volunteer as-
sociation that assisted them in their fight was being charged
with violation of federal labor law. Eventually, a consent order
was signed,203 and the Department of Labor dropped the suit, on
the condition that the picket lines were withdrawn.
The use of foreign workers under various federal programs
by agricultural employers has also posed an obstacle to the abil-
ity of farm workers to improve their conditions.20" Under the H-
2 program, 05 for example, if a foreign worker in this country by
virtue of an employer's request to the Department of Labor is
fired for any reason, the worker can be deported without a hear-
ing.206 This clearly serves to discourage these "guest workers"
from complaining or joining citizen workers in any protest or job
action. For workers in the country without any official "guest
worker" status,0 7 the threat of action by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) is constant, whether or not the
worker is engaged in actions against the employer. If an undocu-
mented worker does file a complaint with the Department of La-
bor, the Department is required under an agreement with INS
to submit the name of the worker to INS.205
The INS has not been the only official agency called on to
"sweep" farm workers out of the way when it is no longer expe-
dient to have them around. For example, until the New York
Court of Appeals ruled it unconstitutional in 1967,09 New
202. Since they were "agricultural workers" rather than "employees" under NLRA.
203. The order, signed April of 1979, stated that EFWA was recognized not to be a
"labor organization" under NLMRDA, and EFWA agreed, for its part, to notify the La-
bor Department if it ever decided to "deal with" an employer as described in the Act.
Marshall v. Eastern Farm Workers Ass'n, No. 76 Civ. 167.
204. See generally, discussion of this problem in ACLU REPORT, supra note 119, at
62-66.
205. "H-2" comes from the Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (current verion at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982)), which provides that workers can
be admitted for temporary labor if sufficient unemployed U.S. workers capable of per-
forming the work cannot be found. To qualify, an employer has to receive certification
from the Department of Labor that American workers weren't willing and able to per-
form the jobs and that there will be no "adverse effect" on wages and working condi-
tions. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(4)(ii).
206. ACLU REPORT, supra note 119, at 66.
207. That is, "undocumented" or "illegal" aliens.
208. ACLU REPORT, supra note 119, at 30 & app. II.
209. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 739 (1967).
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York's vagrancy law was used regularly to keep farm workers off
the streets of Long Island's tourist towns during the summers,
and to insure that growers could keep workers from leaving
under threat of arrest by local police. However, the threat of de-
portation, used regularly to prevent large numbers of foreign
born workers from protesting conditions that are clearly illegal,
has the added insidious effect of dividing the agricultural
workforce against itself. Through the successful use of these tac-
tics of fear and intimidation against foreign workers, 'citizen
farm workers have been made to view the foreign worker as the
enemy.210
Existing farm worker organizations have taken divergent
views on the issue of whether to include these undocumented
workers in their organizational efforts.2 ' Cesar Chavez and the
United Farm Workers (UFW) have traditionally called for
stricter enforcement of immigration laws against the undocu-
mented worker. The Texas Farm Workers Union has, on the
other hand, consistently maintained that inclusion of these
workers will make their membership stronger. Because farm
workers are excluded from NLRB jurisdiction, the Labor Board
has never had occasion to rule on whether undocumented farm
workers would be included in a bargaining unit of farm workers.
The Board did decide such a question recently, however, in an
analogous case involving undocumented workers employed in a
leather processing plant. In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the United
States Supreme Court upheld an NLRB decision which included
these workers in the bargaining unit, and charged the employer
with an unfair labor practice for turning them in to the INS in
order to circumvent the Board's order to include them.2 2 The
court approved the NLRB's reading of the term "any em-
ployee ' 21 3 to include undocumented workers, and went on to ex-
plain that such inclusion was consistent with the purpose of the
National Labor Relations Act in encouraging and protecting the
collective bargaining process. It reasoned:
210. In the immediate sense, this is probably true, since he has the effect of depress-
ing the wages, etc.
211. Farm Labor Foots the Bill, Long Island Farmworker, Nov., 1986, at 3.
212. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
213. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). ("Any employee" does not, however, include farm workers,
domestic workers, etc.)
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[A]cceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard
terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously
depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens
and legally admitted aliens; and employment of illegal
aliens under such conditions can diminish the effective-
ness of labor unions .... If undocumented alien workers
were excluded from participation in union activities and
from protections against employer intimidation, there
would be created a sub-class of workers without a compa-
rable stake in the collective goals of their legally resident
co-workers, thereby eroding the unity of all the employ-
ees and impeding effective collective bargaining.21
It is ironic that the recent passage by Congress of the Simp-
son-Rodino Immigration Law215 will undermine the potentially
significant effect of the Sure-Tan decision. The Sure-Tan Court
explicitly based its holding on the fact that such inclusion under
NLRA did not conflict with the policy of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) because "Congress has not adopted provi-
sions in INA making it unlawful for an employer to hire an alien
who is present or working in the U.S. without appropriate au-
thorization."2 6 Congress, in passing Simpson-Rodino, has now
done just that.
The introduction of the crew chief or the undocumented
worker has not been the only obstacles placed in the way of farm
workers' efforts to deal with an employer. When agribusiness
contracts for the product of the farm workers' labor through the
intermediary of the small farmer, redress through traditional di-
rect labor action is again foreclosed. A case in point is the recent
struggle undertaken by the Farm Labor Organizing Committee
(FLOC), an Ohio based organizing drive representing migrants
employed in the tomato fields of northwest Ohio. Over 2000
workers sought a contract with Campbell Soup Company in Au-
214. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892. It would seem that this same argument could be in
favor of the inclusion in general of "unrecognized workers," since they have the same
"depressing" effect on the U.S. labor force as a whole. However, that question was clearly
beyond the scope of the Court's decision in Sure-Tan.
215. Immigration Reform & Control (Simpson-Rodino Immigration) Act of 1986, 8
U.S.C. § 1101. For discussion of Simpson-Rodino, see Kesselbrenner, Challenging Simp-
son-Rodino, Guild Notes, Winter, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
216. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892-93. See supra note 205.
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gust, 1978.217 The workers, employed in the fields of individual
farmers who held contracts with Campbell, were paid at piece
rates amounting to an estimated $1.96 per hour.2" Campbell re-
fused to negotiate and claimed that it was not the employer.21
9
When a walkout by the workers had no effect on Campbell, 2 '
FLOC initiated a nationwide boycott of Campbell's products. It
took the workers eight years to force Campbell to sign an un-
precedented three-party agreement covering six hundred work-
ers. The agreement, signed in January, 1986, set prices to be
paid by Campbell to farmers in order to guarantee $4.50 per
hour, insurance, and a grievance procedure, as well as union rec-
ognition for FLOC.221 The boycott, first used successfully by ag-
ricultural workers in the grape fields of California in the fif-
ties,222 has recently been outlawed in three of four states that
have given farm workers the right to bargain collectively.2 23
Idaho, Kansas and Arizona all have made the secondary boycott
an "unfair labor practice." Additionally, Kansas and Arizona
have outlawed strikes by farm workers during critical harvest
seasons. 2 4 While California's legislature has yet to proscribe
these activities, it has virtually defunded the showpiece of that
state's legislation, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board
(ALRB). With a backlog of election and hearing petitions pend-
ing before the ALRB due to staff and funding shortages, UFW
last year called California's farm labor act "useless," and called
once again for a nationwide boycott of table grapes.22 5 Ulti-
mately, it has not been laws, but organization, that has produced
217. BNA REPORT, supra note 4, at 62-66.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 63-64. The farmers, for their part, claimed they were powerless to increase
the rates since Campbell set the prices to be paid for the crops.
220. Historically, strikes by farm workers have been ineffective due to, among other
things, the impossibility of blocking access to the fields. Here, there existed the added
problem that the fields did not belong to Campbell, and it was free to go elsewhere to
seek tomato crops.
221. Boycotts Revisited, DOLLARS & SENSE, July-Aug., 1986, at 13.
222. DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642 (1951). The court held that DiGi-
orgio could not invoke NLRA's prohibition of the boycott against workers who were not
employees under NLRB jurisdiction.
223. Koziara, Agricultural Labor Relations Laws in Four States - A Comparison,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May, 1977, at 14-18.
224. Id.
225. BNA REPORT, supra note 4, at 65.
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the few advances farm workers have made. It is arguable, from
the examples above, that the laws that do exist have at times
hindered the efforts of farm workers more than they have
helped.
VIII. "CONTINGENT" WORKERS
While farm and domestic workers are the two most identifi-
able categories of "unrecognized worker," several additional job
categories of equally unsettled status have been created or re-
inspired in recent years. The New York Times, in a front page
article2' 6 described an increasing reliance by employers on tem-
porary, part-time and "leased" or subcontracted workers as a
major factor in the destabilization of the labor movement and an
undermining of the hard won protection of the labor laws.22
Describing a growing "weakening of ties" between the employer
and employee, the article estimated the size of this "contingent"
workforce at 29.5 million. The article cited as the major reason
for the rapid expansion of this workforce, the fact that it allows
employers to reduce labor costs, payment of benefits, and in
some cases, unionization2 28 One of the sub-categories within this
pool of workers, employees in the "temp help supplier indus-
try, '229 has nearly doubled in three years from 400,000 to a Sep-
tember, 1986 figure of 750,000.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, only 6% of the
"Business Service Industry" is organized. Even if workers in this
industry are found to be "employees, '"230 it is of the temporary
agency, rather than the workplace. While an average employer
may pay $17.65 an hour, the average temp worker earns $6.38 an
226. Serrin, Part-Time Work, New Labor Trend, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1986, at 1, col.
1.
227. Id. See also ILO REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
228. Serrin, supra note 226, at 14.
229. This category is exemplified by such agencies as "Kelly Girls" and "Manpower."
Workers in this category are generally considered employees of the agency.
230. According to Thomas Bailey, Associate Resident Scholar at the Conservation of
Human Resources Program of Columbia University, while he is skeptical of the claim
that avoidance of unionization is the motivation for use of temps, he notes that even if
temp workers are technically covered under the labor laws, high turnover and lack of
central location are factors that make organizing extremely difficult. Telephone interview
with Thomas Bailey, Associate Resident Scholar at the Conservation of Human Re-
sources Program of Columbia University (Jan. 6, 1987).
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hour, compared to her permanent counterpart earning $8.54.231
In cases where the temporary worker is hired directly, that
worker may be found to have no recognized employee status as
far as inclusion in a bargaining unit.232 This is one of several
factors that make the temp worker useful in breaking strikes, as
was the case in the recent job action against AT&T.233 It is cur-
rently the official policy of the federal government, under a 1985
Executive Order, to employ temporary workers as a way of cut-
ting costs.23 4
If temporary workers have proved expedient for private em-
ployers in cutting labor costs,2"' it is no suprise that the Govern-
ment, with its first trillion dollar budget and a deficit of 107.8
billion projected for fiscal year 1987,236 would "seek greener pas-
tures" as well. This practice may be particularly inviting to gov-
ernment officials since the public sector is the only category that
has seen growth in union membership in the past several
years.237 As of March, 1986, 83,485 temporary workers were em-
ployed by the federal government, in positions ranging from sec-
retaries to professionals.238
IX. WORKFARE: IS THE CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE
With all its fiscal problems, the Government as employer
has one major advantage over its private sector counterparts. It
has available to it a vast pool of workers, reliant on government
aid in some form, who can, under current law, be required to
work for no wages. Simultaneous with the growth of public sec-
tor organizing, the number of welfare recipients "employed"
under various government programs has increased. Ostensibly
designed to get recipients off welfare rolls and into "productive
231. Lapidus, Just to Make Ends Meet, DOLLARS & SENSE, Nov., 1986, at 9.
232. See, e.g., Cardo v. Lakeland School District, 592 F. Supp. 765 (1984); see also
Justak Bros. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1981) (part-time employees who
worked only sporadically were excluded from the bargaining unit).
233. • Lapidus, supra note 231, at 10.
234. Serrin, supra note 226, at 14.
235. See Serrin, Subcontracting: a Key Issue for Labor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1986,
at B8, col. 1.
236. U.P.I., Jan. 6, 1987.
237. BNA REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
238. Serrin, supra note 226, at 14.
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employment, ' 289 such programs have tended instead to produce
a large pool of workers tied permanently to government ser-
vices,2 10 and thus permanently obligated. In exchange for their
labor, these workers get not a living "wage," but a subsistence
level government grant. Due to the wide range of program titles
and definitions in use nationally, accurate figures for determin-
ing the number of recipient-workers employed in these programs
are hard to come by. There is no doubt, however, that the num-
bers are growing, as political pressure to "solve" the "welfare
problem" increases.
Under the 1981 Federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act,24' a federal Community Work Experience Program
(CWEP)211 was created; which, for the first time, authorized
states to require all Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) recipients to work in public or private non-profit agen-
cies directly for their welfare checks.2 3 CWEP additionally per-
mits diversion of welfare grants to private for-profit employers
who agree to provide "on the job training" in exchange for "em-
239. Congressional Declaration of Intent, Job Training Partnership Act, 29 U.S.C. §
1501 (1982).
240. For example, in an interview with the Director of New York City's Work Experi-
ence Management Program, which oversees work assignments of over 15,000 Community
Work Experience Program (CWEP) workers, Fran Sullivan estimated that over 1,500 of
the current workers have been on the program longer than a year. According to Welfare
Department statistics for October, 1986, of 9,547 Home Relief recipients enrolled in the
Work Experience Program, only 188 entered regular employment, and of these, 178 had
found the jobs on their own. Interview with Fran Sullivan, Director of the New York
City Work Experience Management Program (Jan. 8, 1987).
241. 95 Stat. 357 (1981) This act is part of the federal "welfare reform" plan designed
to reduce cost of government and put more reliance on private sector solutions. This Act
introduced workfare on the federal level for the first time on more than an "experimen-
tal" basis.
242. CWEP was originally introduced in California in the early seventies when Ron-
ald Reagan was governor. President Reagan has recently referred to this previous version
as a "success." Lindsay, Reagan Disputed on Work Program, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986,
at 35, col. 1. (One measure of this "success" was that many recipients were cut from the
welfare rolls due to some type of non-compliance with the work requirements.)
243. Previous to this Act, workfare was primarily authorized on a state by state basis,
and only for recipients without children since these programs (e.g., Home Relief in New
York and General Assistance in California) are non-federally funded. AFDC families
(i.e., those with children under 18 on federally funded assistance) were subject to more
flexible "training" oriented programs, most of which were previously on a volunteer ba-
sis. See generally Gueron, Work Initiatives for Welfare Recipients, Manpower Demon-
stration Research Corp. (Mar. 1986).
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ploying" the subsidized worker. 44 The federal formula under
this program for determining the number of hours the recipients
will be required to work, is to divide the amount of the monthly
grant by the minimum wage. Workers who refuse assignment are
subject to sanctions, including complete loss of all welfare bene-
fits for thirty, sixty or ninety days.2 "
While workfare is hardly a new concept, CWEP expands the
category of employable recipients by including mothers with
young children.2 " The other significant "contribution" to the
workfare concept is the addition of private for-profit businesses
to the list of potential employers.2 47 These recent amendments
to the body of federal workfare regulations are just beginning to
be implemented by the states, and have yet to be challenged in
the courts. As the role of workfare, both in the social welfare
schemata and in the national employment picture, is increased,
such challenges can be expected. Historically, the cases involving
work requirements that have reached the courts have encom-
passed the position of recipient "qua beneficiary," rather than as
"worker," and the challenges have centered on such issues as ad-
244. Id. at 3.
245. According to a New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA) report
from October of 1986, out of approximately 11,000 employable AFDC recipients sent to
various job assignments, 1785 were sanctioned for some form of non-compliance. New
York City Human Resources Administration, Comprehensive Employment Report (Oc-
tober 1986). See also Statewide Youth Advocacy Inc., Early Evidence From Monitoring,
New York City's Employment Initiative For Public Assistance (AFDC) Recipients (May
1986). This report includes case histories of several recipients who were terminated due
to faulty communication.
246. Gueron, supra note 243. See also Dublino v. New York State Dep't of Social
Servs., 348 F. Supp. 290 (1972) (regarding differences in treatment of AFDC versus
Home Relief recipients vis-a-vis work requirements).
247. Though the language of CWEP couches use of workfare recipients in private
settings in terms of "training," the fact that this use has tremendous potential for ex-
ploitation, and may be in violation not only of U.S. constitutional law, see infra, text
accompanying notes 296-97, but potentially of international law. The International La-
bor Organization (ILO) in Geneva has produced an instrument, ratified by many nations,
called the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29). It specifically prohibits forced and
compulsory labor for "the benefit of private individuals, companies or associations." ILO
REPORT, supra note 1, at 67. This convention was followed by the Abolition of Forced
Labor Convention, 1957 (No. 105), which additionally requires, inter alia, the abolition
of any form of forced or compulsory labor "as a method of mobilising and using labor for
purposes of economic development." Id. at 67. While the government has claimed that
this is not the purpose of workfare, there is evidence, see infra note 285, that this is not
the case.
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equate notice before termination2 4 8 or level of grant.2 49 As the
use of this "involuntary labor force" becomes more widespread,
however, some definition of its rights or status "qua workers" is
required.
The first legal test of the rights of "relief" workers in the
U.S. courts arose in the context of claims by workers injured in
the course of their "assignments." While most of the early fed-
eral work relief projects included statutory provisions to protect
the injured worker,250 many state statutes did not even consider
the question of liability for such injury. Those that did were di-
vided on the question of whether the worker was to be consid-
ered an "employee" for the purpose of compensation. 51 Courts,
in reviewing the validity of these statutes and the legislative def-
initions given to the status of these workers, employed varying
criteria to determine whether an employer-employee relation-
ship existed. These included whether the relationship was volun-
tary or compulsory, the type of work performed, the mode of
payment, and the amount of control being exercised over the
worker by the agency. 5 The earliest of these decisions were pre-
mised on the assumption that a viable "employment relation-
ship" must be founded on a "contract of hire." Where the gov-
ernment was obliged to provide the relief, and the indigent was
required to reimburse the government with his services, the
work was found to be compulsory. Under such circumstances,
courts held that no "master-servant" relationship could exist,
and, therefore, the worker was excluded from the coverage of the
state's compensation laws.2 8
On the other hand, courts in Ohio and Pennsylvania found
248. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Lavine, 82 Misc. 2d 322, 368 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
249. See Young v. Toia, 93 Misc. 2d 1005, 403 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1977); see also
Milwaukee County v. Donovan, 711 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1985).
250. See Polier & Donner, The Status and Rights of Injured Relief Workers, 36
COLUM. L. REV. 555, 570 (1936). The Works Project Administration (WPA), for example,
set a monthly minimum payment of twenty-five dollars and expressly stated that the
worker was not to be considered a federal employee. Additionally, Polier & Donner pre-
sent an extensive historical survey of the use of work requirements attached to public
"welfare," since the English "Poor Laws" of the middle ages. See generally id.
251. Brook & Simon, Relief Workers and Workmen's Compensation, 36 ILL. L. REv.
773 (1942).
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Vaivida v. City of Grand Rapids, 264 Mich. 204, 249 N.W. 492 (1933);
McBurney v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 220 Cal. 124, 30 P.2d 414 (1934).
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that the government agencies had the power to accept or reject a
particular worker. This led them to the conclusion that the em-
ployment relationship was voluntary, thus entitling the worker
to state compensation.2 54
The recent trend has been to consider these workers em-
ployees for the sole purpose of liability for injury. A recent Cali-
fornia case involved a challenge by a "workfare" recipient under
Los Angeles County's General Assistance program. He was de-
nied compensation by the state after being hurt in his assigned
job as a watchman in a local school district. The court firmly
rejected the early California precedent which had denied em-
ployee status when the work was compulsory, and held that the
worker was entitled to Workers' Compensation. 55
In New York, a 1980 administrative opinion summarized
the official position of the recipients under that state's Home
Relief Program by declaring that "persons receiving home relief
who are assigned to perform work for a municipality pursuant to
Social Service Law § 164 are employees of that municipality and
are therefore entitled to Workers' Compensation benefits. 2 56
In terms of wages, the federal CWEP program specifically
requires that workers assigned to CWEP jobs receive the mini-
mum wage. 57 Such specific wage provisions have not, however,
always been included in comparable state work programs. Prior
to 1977, New York's Home Relief Program provided for compu-
tation of hours based on the size of the grant without specifying
an hourly wage to be used in the calculation. Under a 1977
254. See, e.g., Industrial Commission of Ohio v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40 (1934);
Hattler v. Wayne County, 117 Pa. Super. 570, 178 A. 513 (Super. Ct. 1935), aff'd per
curiam, 320 Pa. 280, 182 A. 526 (1936).
255. County of Los Angeles v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 30 Cal. 3d 391
(1981). In rejecting McBurney, the court noted:
Paradoxically, the California courts concede that the purpose in creating the re-
lationship [between the relief worker and the government unit for whom he
worked] was to 'avert the stigma of pauperism' and then deny that the parties
have succeeded in doing so. Thus, workfare participants should not have been
treated as disfavored paupers merely because they needed to accept work from
the government in order to keep from starving.
30 Cal. 3d at 402.
256. Op. State Compt. 80-256 (1980). They are specifically not, however, employees
for other purposes, such as civil service status. See Ballantine v. Sugarman, 74 Misc. 2d
267, 344 N.Y.S. 2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
257. Thus avoiding the need for any legal determination of a CWEP worker's status
under FLSA.
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amendment, the law was changed to read that "[e]ach person
assigned to a public work project shall be required to participate
an average of three days per week without regard to the amount
of budget deficit of the person or his family. ' '258 Workers who, as
a result, were being forced to work for well below the minumum
wage, challenged this provision in the case of Young v. Toia.2 59
One of the named plaintiffs, Tina Young, was being required to
work 104 hours per month as a painter for thirty dollars of state
aid, or twenty cents an hour. The court ordered compliance not
only with the state minimum wage, but with the state's constitu-
tional mandate that
no laborer, workman or mechanic in the employ of a con-
tractor or subcontractor engaged in the performance of
any public works. . .shall. . .be paid less than the rate of
wages prevailing in the same trade or occupation in the
locality within the state where such public work is to be
situated. '20 o
Since Toia, New York's official policy has been that these
workfare workers are to be "paid" rates at parity with civil ser-
vice workers in comparable job categories.2 1 However, § 164 of
the state's Social Service Law also prohibits use of recipients to
fill jobs "ordinarily and actually performed" by a regular
worker.26 2 To get around this, counties commonly list these jobs
by different titles than those filled by civil servants. 263 This
258. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 164(3)(b) (McKinney 1976), as amended by Chap. 77, § 8
of the Laws of 1977.
259. 403 N.Y.S.2d 390, 93 Misc.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
260. Id. at 394 (citing N.Y. Const. art. I, § 17).
261. A recent survey of the New York Work Experience Project (WEP) program con-
ducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation reports that the "wage"
is determined according to the job category of the work assignment, but that all wages
are under five dollars per hour and over the minimum wage. See G. HOERZ & K. HANSON,
A SURVEY OP PARTICIPANTS AND WORKSITE SUPERVISORS IN THE NEW YORK CITY WORK
EXPERIENCE PROGRAM 5 (Sept. 1986). In the same report, however, the "average" civil
service rate for the job categories surveyed was $5.71 per hour. Id. at 13-14. From this, it
would appear that New York is not in compliance with official policy as established in
Toia.
262. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 164(2)(b) (McKinney 1976).
263. See, e.g., Memorandum on Behalf of Petitioners, District Council 37 v. Koch,
No. 15508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). In general, for every "civil service" title, the Public
Workers Project (PWP) title has added "aide" (e.g., "messenger" becomes "messenger
aide").
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practice serves to insulate the localities from liability under both
the "no displacement" and the "prevailing wage"
requirements.264
An earlier challenge to compliance with both of these provi-
sions was mounted in the 1973 case of Ballentine v.
Sugarman,26 which involved workers assigned to perform mu-
nicipal jobs under the Public Workers Project (PWP).26 6 The
original plaintiffs were New York City home relief recipients
who claimed they were not receiving wages and benefits at par-
ity with those of regular civil service employees performing the
same work. The recipients claimed they were entitled to these
wages and benefits under state regulations.261 In the alternative,
they asked for a declaration that the forced labor aspect of the
program constituted illegal "peonage."26 They were joined in
their suit by representatives of the regular city employees who,
for their part, sought an injunction against the use of these
home relief workers to displace civil service positions.26 9
The court, in dismissing the petition, held that the program
violated neither the statutory "no displacement" provisions nor
the state constitution's "merit and fitness" requirements for civil
service hiring. It based this part of its opinion on a factual find-
ing that the program was intended merely to "supplement" the
work of regular employees during a time of manpower shortages
due to budgetary restrictions.2 70 As to the argument that the
program violated federal anti-peonage statutes, the court la-
belled it "unpersuasive and without merit in all respects. 2 71 It
also held that these workers were not civil service employees and
264. These requirements are found both in the statute itself, see supra note 262, and
in the New York State Constitution. See Toia, 93 Misc.2d 1005, 403 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup.
Ct. 1977).
265. 74 Misc.2d 267, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
266. Currently called "Work Experience Project" (WEP).
267. 74 Misc.2d at 269, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
268. Id. The thirteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitute, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. "Pe-
onage" is defined as "a condition of servitude compelling persons to perform labor in
order to pay off a debt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1022 (5th ed. 1979).
269. 74 Misc.2d at 269, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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therefore were not entitled to fringe benefits.272 Finally, the
court deferred the question of whether the state's "comparable
wage" requirement was being complied with to a future hearing,
noting, however, that "it is neither possible, nor the Court's
duty. . . to conduct a wide ranging inquiry to ascertain the facts
as to all these 21,000 employees. '273 The city claimed it was pay-
ing parity wages. Ultimately, the question boiled down to the job
title given to the particular worker.274
A year after Ballentine, the state home relief work program
underwent a name change and was restructured to more closely
simulate the actual "w number of positions available to be filled
through regular civil service channels. 75
In subsequent inge benefits were now to be provided. It is
noteworthy that this version of the program specified that the
workers were to be granted collective bargaining rights as well.276
In Gotbaum v. Sugarman,277 compliance with the non-displace-
ment clause was once again challenged by the same union that
represented civil service workers in Ballentine. Again, the court
refused to find the program violative of the state law or constitu-
tion, retionalizing that decision on the grounds that "no true
employer-employee relationship with the agencies where they
work" existed.2 78 The court went on to dismiss the complaint
with the assurance that:
There appears to be no danger that an extra-legal and
cognate system of government employment will be set up
to evade the principle of merit. . . There is no indication
whatever that employment of any of these persons on the
welfare rolls will reduce the budgetary allocation for the
272. Id. at 273, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 45. This is circuitous in that the city had been argu-
ing that their lack of benefits was evidence that they were not civil service workers. See
infra text accompanying note 284.
273. 74 Misc.2d at 273, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 45. Note, however, the court's use of the term
"employees."
274. G. HOERZ & K. HANSON, supra note 261.
275. The Work Relief Experience Program. This was an experiment conducted dur-
ing the administration of Mayor John Lindsay. It was approved by the state on a one
year "demonstration" basis only, and was promptly rescinded when the year was up.
276. These provisions obviously brought the relationship of the worker closer than
ever to one of an "employee" of the Government.
277. 78 Misc.2d 827, 829, 358 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
278. Id. at 831, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
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number of positions available to be filled through regular
civil service channels.""
In subsequent years, similar decisions on the question of
civil service displacement were rendered in relation to the Com-
prehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA).5 ° In
Campesi v. McGuire,"1 a policeman had been laid off during the
1975 budget crisis and reinstalled in the same job between May
1977 and March 1978 under CETA. When he was finally rehired
under as a civil service employee, he was denied the right to
count the CETA time towards seniority or promotion. The court
held that to rule otherwise, i.e., that a CETA worker had been
acting as a civil service employee, would violate "state constitu-
tional and statutory law, as well as federal proscriptions." '282
When District Council 37 (DC37), the union that had been
involved in the Ballentine and Gotbaum challenges, found it
was unable to win a frontal attack against the home relief work
program, it tried instead in 1981 to eliminate the program's po-
tential for creating a scab labor force. The union petitioned the
New York City Office of Collective Bargaining for certification to
"accrete" the PWP workers as city employees in existing bar-
gaining units for which it held certificates.2 8 In opposition to
the petition, the city offered four arguments:
1) The language of the statute creating PWP, labelling the
workers as "recipients" and describing them as "employable but
not employed," negated any inference that the legislature in-
tended that they be considered employees. The city claimed that
this interpretation was further supported by the fact that the
worker received a welfare check, not a pay check, and received
no fringe benefits other than Workers' Compensation.
2) The city lacked sufficient control over the workers to con-
279. Id.
280. Under CETA, 87 Stat. 839 (1973), 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-999, repealed by 96 Stat.
1357 (Oct. 13, 1982), there were six different programs ranging from those aimed at sup-
plementing civil service staff, to others directed at giving short-term work experience to
minors. See Papa v. Ravo, 70 A.D.2d 59, 419 N.Y.S.2d 698 (App. Div. 1979) (where the
court ruled that CETA workers were not entitled to seniority or other civil service
benefits).
281. 88 A.D.2d 866, 451 N.Y.S.2d 767 (App. Div. 1982).
282. Id. at 869, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 768. The Campesi court cited Ballantine v.
Sugarman, 74 Misc.2d 267, 270, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42, as authority for this conclusion.
283. OCB Decision No. 21-81 (June 30, 1981). These workers now number 15,000.
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stitute an employer relationship, since it was the state that de-
fined the program, the amount of the grant, etc. The city
claimed it was required to place the recipients in the work pro-
gram "without regard to [its] needs or desire for the recipients'
services."
3) The fact that the PWP workers' labor was involuntary
prevented a finding of employee status. 84 As further support for
this conclusion, the city pointed to the fact that the work pro-
grams had "rehabilitation" as their primary aim, with the "ser-
vice" received by the city being only incidental to the "service"
the city rendered to the recipients by providing them with useful
skills.28 5
4) Since the grant was based on the recipients' need rather
than on the value of the work performed, it was not "compensa-
tion for services" and did not evidence an employee
relationship.286
The union's position was that the city agencies did have a
choice in "hiring" recipients, and in fact applied for workers,
conducted interviews, set tasks and job descriptions, established
hours, etc.2 8 7 Additionally, the union maintained that the
worker's participation was no less "voluntary" because of loss of
payment due to non-participation, than loss of salary would be
to regular workers who failed to perform their jobs.28 Finally,
284. Id. To support this position, the city cited Prisoners Labor Union at Bedford
Hills v. Helsby, 44 A.D.2d 707, 354 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div. 1974) (PERB denied a peti-
tion by prisoners in various state facilities in which they asked to be certified to bargain,
on the ground that their labor lacked "volition").
285. OCB Decision No. 21-81. This is directly contradicted by the Sept. 1986 Man-
power survey, which almost universally found that the work performed was essential to
the functioning of the agencies involved, and that the work supervisors felt that the ma-
jority of workers/recipients came to the jobs they filled with the skills needed to fill
them. G. HOERZ & K. HANSON, supra note 261, at 15, 21.
286. OCB Decision No. 21-81. This, however, appears to contradict the holding in
Toia that pay had to be computed at parity scale for hours worked rather than devoid of
any relation to the value of the work performed.
287. Contrary to the city's claim that it "must" employ all eligible recipients regard-
less of the city's own manpower needs, only some 15,000 out of a pool of 120,000 recipi-
ents considered by HRA to be "employable and available" were in actual assignments as
of December, 1986. New York City Human Resources Administration, Employability Re-
ports (Dec. 1986). See, NEw YORK CITY HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, WORK EXPERIENCE PROGRAM (1986) (promotional flyer sent to
city and non-profit agencies soliciting requests for workfare assignees and describing the
"application" process to obtain workers).
288. OCB Decision 21-81, at 14.
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the union claimed:
Economic realities being what they are, it is unrealistic to
expect PWP workers to gain employment in the 'regular'
economy and that they should not be penalized simply
because they are forced by law to go through the motions
of doing so. . .Although the law prohibits PWP workers
from replacing workers in the regular economy, the fact
is that they do. They should, therefore, be given the same
employee status as those workers.18 1
Recognizing that "no case has been found which directly
deals with the status of working welfare recipients, ' '29 0 the OCB
denied the petition. It held, in addition to the arguments pro-
pounded by the city, that since the entire program was termina-
ble at state discretion, the city's control was merely
"derivative. 2 91
Rather than appeal the OCB's decision, DC37 chose once
again to attempt to enjoin the use of PWP workers on the
grounds that, contrary to the court's rationale in Gotbaum, there
was in fact evidence of an "extra-legal and cognate system of
government employment"' 92 emerging. In 1982, armed with new
statistics showing a steady decrease in civil service positions as
well as line for line identical job descriptions for current civil
service and PWP titles, the union in District Council 37 v. Koch,
charged:
At this historic juncture, given the high level of unem-
ployment, the absence of jobs in either the public or pri-
vate sector labor markets, and the crying need for city
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. The OCB didn't comment on whether PERB would therefore have jurisdiction if
the state in fact "controlled" the employee. The question of "temporary" and "termina-
ble" was raised similarly in Mon Valley United Health Services, 238 NLRB 916 (1978).
There, the NLRB ruled that federal manpower trainees in a private non-profit mental
health center should be included in the regular bargaining unit based on a "substantial
community of interest," and said that the indefiniteness of the duration of their employ-
ment based on the federal government's ability to terminate the funds was an insuffi-
cient basis. See also Evergreen Legal Services, 246 N.L.R.B. 964 (1979) where the NLRB
reached a similar conclusion regarding CETA workers (lawyers and others) in a Legal
Services Corporation-funded project in Washington State.
292. Gotbaum, 78 Misc. 2d at 831, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
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services, it is not unreasonable to conclude that PWP
participants are being used soley as a permanent under-
paid labor force to supplement the city's manpower
shortage. 9
This time, rather than attempting to dispute that allegation,
the court, conceding that PWP workers made up 8-12% of the
agencies' workforce and that the program could "at least in the-
ory, pose a threat to the state's traditional civil service system,"
directed the union to the legislature as the more appropriate
arena in which to address its grievances.294
X. CONCLUSION
It is appropriate at this point to raise a fundamental contra-
diction in the positions taken by the Government throughout
the above attempts to define the status of workfare workers. On
the one hand, New York City and the OCB argued that the
PWP workers had no choice but to work, likening their situation
to prisoners in Greenhaven Correctional Facility who were de-
nied recognition to bargain for lack of "volition" in their em-
ployment status.295 The Board relies on this "involuntariness" to
define the PWP workers as "not employees."
On the other hand, the PWP plaintiffs, in Ballentine v.
Sugarman, had their claim that the program constituted illegal
peonage in violation of the thirteenth amendment dismissed out
of hand as fallacious, based on a previous ruling in Dublino v.
New York State Department of Social Services.2 9 The Ballen-
tine court, quoting a court of appeals interpretation of the fed-
eral anti-peonage statutes, said:
293. Memorandum on Behalf of Petitioners at 13 n.8, District Council 37 v. Koch,
No. 15508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). According to the memorandum, by the city's own admis-
sion over 31% of all PWP participants work for periods in excess of one year; 19% in
excess of two years. 55% of PWP participants have been unemployed for over two years;
24 % for at least seven years. Id.
294. Id.
295. See supra note 284. The court didn't distinguish the fact that prisoners are the
only group that is exempt from the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involun-
tary servitude. The fact that the condition of PWP workers is considered so similar to
that of prisoners is strong indication that the thirteenth amendment may well be vio-
lated here. Workfare recipients have been "convicted" of nothing except poverty.
296. 348 F. Supp. 290 (1972).
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"However difficult the loss of home relief is, a person is
not held in a state of peonage when the only sanction for
his refusing to work is that he will not receive payments
currently. That may be a form of mankind's immemorial
bondage of bread; but it is not peonage. "297
There is an irreconcilable contradiction between these two
positions, and it is precisely within that contradiction that an
ominous future awaits a divided labor movement. Workfare
workers, and others "outside of the normal channels of com-
merce and the traditional employer-employee relationship," can-
not continue to play the role of "involuntary scab," without any
legal avenue for redress of their grievances nor means of taking
their place as workers in organized efforts to improve their col-
lective condition. Whether or not the courts and legislatures rec-
ognize the right of these workers to organize, the rest of the la-
bor movement must, or its members may find themselves
"displaced" and on the other end of a PWP intake desk.
In a case that portends of this "ominous future" for labor,
General Assistance'." recipients in Sacramento, California, have
challenged a program in that county that requires them to work,
not for a welfare check, but for room and board in a Volunteers
of America "shelter." In Robbins v. the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County,2 99 an initial injunction against this "experimen-
tal" program has been issued, while the constitutionality under
the federal and state constitutions300 is decided. Given the
precedents outlined above, this "quasi-governmental labor
camp" may still be found to be not only legal, but a "final solu-
tion" to the problems of unemployment, homelessness and high
cost of government all in one-all current national plagues.
Whether or not one believes that this scenario is preferable to
297. Ballentine, 74 Misc.2d at 273, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 45 (quoting U.S. v. Shackney, 333
F.2d 475, 486 (1964)).
298. General Assistance is California's version of New York's Home Relief program,
for single adults.
299. 38 Cal.3d 199, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695 (1985).
300. The California State Constitution includes an explicit right to privacy, CAL.
CONST. art I, § 1, as well as due process, equal protection, art I, § 7, and anti-"involun-
tary servitude" clauses, art. I, § 6.
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the 19th century "hands off" policy of the Government towards
labor, the price of liberty is the same now as it was then:
organization.
Sue Wasserman
